

JPRS-UMA-94-019

18 May 1994



**FOREIGN
BROADCAST
INFORMATION
SERVICE**

JPRS Report

Central Eurasia

Military Affairs

Central Eurasia

Military Affairs

JPRS-UMA-94-019

CONTENTS

18 May 1994

CIS/RUSSIAN MILITARY ISSUES

ARMED FORCES

Increase in Number of Generals Quantified <i>[ARGUMENTY I FAKTY No 19, May]</i>	1
---	---

POLICY

Questions on Russian Bases in 'Near Abroad' <i>[MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI No 15, 10-17 Apr]</i>	1
Shaposhnikov Urges Russian Leadership of CIS Integration Process <i>[OBSHCAYA GAZETA No 15, 15 Apr]</i>	2
Zhirinovskiy Deputy Calls for Increased Arms Sales <i>[OBSHCAYA GAZETA 8 Apr]</i>	4
Views of Gaydar, Others on Defense Budget <i>[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 9 Apr]</i>	7
Nikolayev Becomes Member of Security Council <i>[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 19 Apr]</i>	7
Grachev Meets with Rabin <i>[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 29 Apr]</i>	7
Grachev 7 May Press Conference <i>[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 7 May]</i>	8

STRATEGIC DETERRENT FORCES

History of Development of 'Nuclear Briefcase' <i>[PRAVDA 20 Apr]</i>	8
--	---

GROUND TROOPS

Percentage Breakdown of Draft Deferments <i>[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 20 Apr]</i>	12
CBW Reconnaissance Version of BTR-80 <i>[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 22 Apr]</i>	12

AIR, AIR DEFENSE FORCES

Prudnikov: PVO as Basis for Creation of Aero-Space Defense <i>[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 9 Apr]</i>	13
Russian Academy of Missile, Artillery Sciences Reestablished <i>[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 9 Apr]</i>	14

NAVAL FORCES

Cossacks in Naval Infantry <i>[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 9 Apr]</i>	14
Chernomyrdin Remarks at Dedication of Destroyer 'Beshtreshnyy' <i>[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 19 Apr]</i>	15

STATE AND LOCAL MILITARY FORCES

INTERREGIONAL MILITARY ISSUES

Yeltsin, Kravchuk Agree on Dividing Black Sea Fleet <i>[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 19 Apr]</i>	16
---	----

BALTIC STATES

Composition, Problems of Estonian Armed Forces <i>[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 20 Apr]</i>	16
Latvian Sejm Refuses to Approve Agreement With Russia <i>[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 22 Apr]</i>	18

CAUCASIAN STATES

New Opportunity To 'Regulate' Karabakh Conflict <i>[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 13 Apr]</i>	19
Karabakh: Fighting Picks Up Around Geranboysk <i>[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 14 Apr]</i>	20
Fighting Continues in Karabakh <i>[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 21 Apr]</i>	20

GENERAL ISSUES

ARMS TRADE

Vladimir Arms Show Planned for Late May [KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 19 Apr]	21
Russia Losing Arms Market [NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA No 78 (754), 26 Apr]	21

DOCTRINAL ISSUES

Makarevskiy on Prospects for Military Reform [OBSHCAYA GAZETA No 13/38, 1 Apr]	23
Gareyev Calls for More Attention to Military-Scientific Thought [VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL No 4, 1994]	24

FOREIGN MILITARY AFFAIRS

Turkey's Minister of Defense Arrives in Moscow [KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 21 Apr]	29
Grachev Discusses Flank Limits, Bases With Turkey's Minister [KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 22 Apr] ..	29
Russian-South Korean Defense Cooperation Agreement [SEGODNYA 30 Apr]	30

ARMED FORCES

Increase in Number of Generals Quantified

944K1221A Moscow ARGUMENTY I FAKTY in Russian
No 19, May 94 p 2

[Unattributed response to reader inquiry: "How Many Generals Do We Have?"]

[Text] I remember that in 1991 Marshal Akhromeyev, chief of the General Staff, stated that there were 1,939 generals for the 3.8 million servicemen in the USSR Army. How many generals are there in today's Russian Army and the countries of the CIS?

[Signed] A. Lesovets, Vorkuta

After August 1991, the Russian Federation Army was rapidly reduced in size, and by April 1993 its numbers constituted approximately 2.3 million, but the number of generals had grown to 2,218. Just prior to last year's referendum the president conferred the rank of general on 256 officers. As of today, judging by figures that have appeared in the press and that have not as yet been refuted by the Ministry of Defense, there are approximately 2,500 generals or one general per 720 servicemen for 1.8 million servicemen in the Russian Army.

There are problems with the surfeit of generals in other armies of the CIS also. Thus Georgia, for example, has been forced to increase the length of service between ranks to three years for junior officers and to five years for senior officers. The same trend has emerged in the Ukrainian Army, where, despite an appreciable reduction in troops, the number of generals has tripled.

For comparison: The U.S. Army has approximately 1,250 generals, that is, one general per 1,500 servicemen (not counting the reserve).

There were 80 more generals in the Russian Army by the time of the May holidays....

POLICY

Questions on Russian Bases in 'Near Abroad'

94UM0401A Moscow MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI
in Russian No 15, 10-17 Apr 94 p A14

[Unattributed article: "Nine Questions for the Russian President's Team"]

[Text] Last week's publication of a document proposing the creation of military bases on the soil of the Russian Federation, the CIS member countries, and Latvia leaves a number of questions unanswered.

1. How could the document be passed from the RF Ministry of Defense to the president's administration, if Minister of Defense Pavel Grachev knew nothing about it?
2. Why is it mentioned in the document that the MID [Ministry of Foreign Affairs] is informed of the initiative, while this ministry in reality had no knowledge of it whatsoever? Why did the document, (which is directly concerned with foreign policy), not receive the stamp of approval by the very ministry involved with foreign policy?
3. How is it that, in the president's administration, the document bypassed the people who are directly involved with coordinating Russia's foreign policy actions and who are responsible for the president maintaining communication with the MID and RF MO [Ministry of Defense]? It would definitely appear that they should be informed of all initiatives associated with these ministries.
4. Why indeed did the president, who is informed of the progress made in the talks being held between Russia and Latvia, sign the document?
5. Why is it that the document (the text is not an issue here), in which the RF MID and the MO were to merely hold the attendant TALKS with the CIS member countries and Latvia, did not bear the secret security classification?
6. How did the document fall into the hands of ITAR-TASS?
7. The failure to coordinate the actions taken by the MO, MID, and president's administration became an object of scrutiny by the press twice in 10 days (counting as the first time the changing of the day of signing of the Partnership for Peace), smacking of a scandal. What is this? Deep political differences which cannot be kept hidden, or is it bureaucratic confusion carried to absurdity?
8. Who (other than the Ministry of Defense clerk who included Latvia in the list of states on whose territory it is proposed to create Russian military bases) will be held responsible for what has happened? It must be realized that the scandal not only reinforces the world's thinking that Russia's foreign and domestic policy is unpredictable, but it also exerts a direct influence on the political, economic, and social conditions attending the Russian-speaking minority residing in the Baltics.
9. Can it be guaranteed that the same thing will not occur in the future?

Any citizen of Russia can and does ask himself the above questions. And if it so happens that an "explanation via diplomatic channels" satisfies Riga, this would definitely be insufficient as far as the Russian public is concerned.

Shaposhnikov Urges Russian Leadership of CIS Integration Process

94UM0403A Moscow OBSHCAYA GAZETA in Russian No 15, 15 Apr 94 p 7

[Article by Yevgeniy Shaposhnikov under rubric "Reflections": "Russia-USSR-CIS-What Else?"]

[Text] Russia, and not just Russia, but practically all states located on one-sixth of dry land, now are experiencing the drama and tragedy of another transition period.

This is the second transition period in the 20th century. The first, which began with the revolution of 1917, ended in December 1922 with the transformation of Russia into the Soviet Union. With the Union's creation, a delayed-action mine was laid beneath its foundations in the form of the disparity between form and content and specifically between the declared equality of all peoples (with nations' right to self-determination right up to separation) and the state's totalitarian essence.

Such a disparity doomed the USSR either to lifelong, hopeless totalitarianism or to future reform. Reforms did not promise to be smooth, but the shocks which befell us proved excessively painful. These shocks were caused not by democratization, glasnost and pluralism in themselves, but by the fact that they developed with a hint of our boundlessness, irresponsibility, recklessness, the populism of politicians, and the indiscriminate fault-finding with everything. The absence of a proper legislative and legal base gave these phenomena an uncontrollability and at times even an absurdity.

Union leadership proved unready for such a development of events and attempted to solve the new problems by old methods, aiming both to acquire capital and maintain innocence, as they say. That is how the events in Tbilisi, Baku and Vilnius became real facts. At the same time, the Union leadership was encouraging claims of components at a lower level (autonomies) to their own sovereignty and independence (South Ossetia, Abkhazia, the Dniester region, Gagauzia and so on), which whipped up the process of reckless sovereignization even more.

With great difficulty the center finally found an algorithm for solving the problem, a new Union treaty, which seemed to suit the majority of republics more or less. In my view, unjustified sluggishness was allowed in realizing this plan. Nevertheless, society as a whole was ready for legitimization of a fundamentally new Union by 20 August 1991. But this event was not destined to come about, since on 19 August we all became witnesses, and many also participants, of quite different events.

I believe that this date (19 August) became a unique point of reference for the next transition period in our history. It was after the August "flatulence" that many components of the USSR lost faith in the center's declarations and interest in its initiatives.

Some did so because of the center's inability to solve the problems which had come to a head in a civilized manner. Others felt they would be able to get by without such a center. All attempts to reanimate the Novo-Ogarevskiy process after August 1991 failed. Many problems hung in the air and a general crisis was imminent.

Society naturally could not be in a state of uncertainty for long. It always needs supports—legal, organizational, moral. The Belovezh agreement on establishing the CIS, developed in Alma-Ata, became one such rather unstable and far from perfect support. It can be viewed as a landmark in the new transition period.

The imperfection of the CIS model lies in the fact that on the one hand it took into account existing realities, and on the other hand it left many questions unresolved. In other words, a new form of mutual relationship of states seemingly had been found, but there was no substance. A painful search for it continues to this day. Life was supposed to have become considerably better for people in the CIS than in the USSR. The importance and nobility of this task are obvious; the difficulty of its accomplishment also is obvious. How is it to be fulfilled?

Above all, don't hurry. Don't pull down everything to the foundations. Don't turn an evolutionary process into a revolutionary one. And most important, don't forget just what the CIS is—a zigzag of history or a historical necessity.

I consider it more important, advisable and necessary to engage in perfecting the form and content both of the Commonwealth itself as well as of the cooperation of peoples in it—without arrogance, without extremes, without shocks. And these steps must be taken above all by those who initiated and legitimized that which we have today. Now we are experiencing a dramatic moment in the struggle between national consciousness of former components of the USSR on the one hand, oppressed in the past and now hypertrophied, and collapsing imperial ambitions on the other.

Certain states go to the point of absurdity in their aspirations for absolute sovereignty. If it is a fuel crisis, it is their own; if it is hunger, it is sovereign; if it is currency, then it is whatever you like, just not Russian, and so on. The impression is created that our fully revved up independent states, not having a clue as to what conditions there will be at the destination, have made a dash toward the point of no return. The important thing was to cross it.

As I see it, the reasons for this lie in the fact that a certain portion of leaders of sovereign states are prisoners of the ambitions of small groups of people of a certain leaning who adjure that absolute sovereignty is a panacea for all troubles—economic, political and social.

Things have reached the point where politicians declaiming for closer integration into the CIS fear to speak loudly about their aspirations, since they will be tagged without delay as traitors to national interests by

nationalists of all colors and hues, who obviously never are to understand that the main reason for an economic slump lies specifically in a severance of ties between states and peoples.

I never will forget a television report from Kharkov, when one elderly man was asked: "How's life?" He responded: "There is nothing to eat here, and they are making missiles." All the unpretentious wisdom of our people is contained in this.

A foreign journalist compared the USSR with a large swimming pool. Formation of the CIS divided this pool with bars: The water in it is common, but swimming is restricted. Further disintegration may lead to where the CIS will have to be compared with a large preserve in which each inhabitant will have his own absolutely independent cage. It is difficult to give recommendations and advice in our time, but why pull down that which is not falling in, break what is not breaking, or tear up what is not tearing, and specifically our age-old spiritual ties, our habits, our way of thinking and life?

Some state figures evidently are indifferent to the fate of those who are not finding their place on the expanses of the CIS today and of those who will live after them. But in spite of everything, one-sixth of the earth will survive; it is obligated to survive. It will take its worthy place in the universe.

If we gaze beyond the year 2000, it is not hard to see the following power centers in the future world:

- North American continent;
- Western Europe;
- Japan and China;
- the Muslim world.

With a weak Russia or CIS, the aforementioned power centers naturally may direct their interests here. But in view of the enormity of expanses (Catherine II contended that Russia is the universe) and the unreceptiveness of our peoples to various kinds of diktat of foreigners, a weak Russia, like a gigantic crater, will be capable of swallowing up all these power centers along with their interests. Herein lies the strength of a weak Russia. Thus, the danger of Russia to the world lies in its weakness.

Conversely, a strong Russia together with other CIS states is capable of serving as a unique balance, equalizing the universe and safeguarding it from ruin. Herein lies the strength and security of a strong Russia.

Russia is a bridge between East and West. It will remain a house for many peoples who rested against it and bowed down before it. Herein lies their fate and Russia's. It will continue to be the keeper of world peace and the security of peoples who populate the Commonwealth.

Being the largest element in a disintegrating but still functioning system, it keeps others afloat like a pontoon

bridge—some by grain, some by timber, others by oil and natural gas, and still others by the ruble, but each and every one by hope.

By the very fact of its unsinkability, Russia is capable also of pulling out others, who, not being able to swim on their own and clinging to each other, most will likely drown if they become uncoupled from Russia.

It is of course possible to catch hold of someone else, but what will be the payment for help?

New market-dollar relations are formed relatively easily, but there is that which does not lend itself to recarving. It is spiritual space, which never was replaced by force and gold. The new helpers of course may offer a hand, but they will not pull you out. It is advantageous for them to keep everyone semisubmerged.

In my view, the disintegration of Russia is the most dangerous among other negative phenomena. Here too one sees the boundless desire of certain components to cross the point of no return as speedily as possible in general confusion.

Not only the autonomies, but also the krais, the oblasts, and even the cities have begun speaking of their sovereignty. It is easy to imagine that as soon as federation components begin to be called states, they immediately will be tempted to acquire all state attributes—army, currency, foreign policy, customs and so on.

It is difficult to answer this question, but it can be asserted that Russia will not survive its own CIS, or whatever it will be called there—it will turn into a kind of "black hole" which will swallow up the Russian state, natural resources, and possibly also peoples. New conquerors with old schemes will rush here, and we or our descendants will be forced to begin everything from the beginning, if we do not lose vitality.

The simplest, most tested method of stopping this element of disintegration is to stand everyone up at attention; whoever does not obey, "sort it out" and punish them. But this already has occurred. The present time, I am sure, will give birth to politicians capable of solving the most difficult and tangled problems by peaceful means alone. They will serve as a worthy counterweight to those who, having become accustomed to the smell of powder and blood today and having lost all faith in any authority, raise up their peoples with frenzy and doom for a struggle in "hotspots."

The most worthy way out of the situation at hand in Russia appears to be one in which a federal center and components of the federation accommodate each other. On this path some are obligated to cast off the armor of hegemonism and chauvinism, and others the armor of separatism and nationalism. But these cast-off "isms" should not be viewed as losses on the battlefield. Most likely this is harmful ballast needed by no one and restricting maneuver; having gotten rid of it, both will acquire confidence and mutual trust.

Simultaneously with this, it is necessary to work out a legislative and legal base together on key problems of our existence, coordinated to the maximum and acceptable to the components.

The common legislative and legal base in turn must not level out the morals, customs, traditions and other national features of federation components. These laws, common for all, must preclude such phenomena as, for example, establishment of an age qualification for the marriage of young people; an instruction, let's say, about what memorable dates to celebrate in federation components, except statewide ones; establishment of movie ticket prices, and so on. In other words, in the many-sided process of creating a new federalism, it is necessary to single out the general and the special. The general unites the center, the special is regulated locally. The general makes our society monolithic, and the special makes it flexible.

By virtue of originality, multinationality, and other purely Russian features, our future social and state system should not be driven artificially into the framework of American, British, Swedish, Japanese and other systems of regulating life, no matter how attractive and civilized they may seem to us.

Naturally, we must study and take in the experience of others, but today we are obliged to display our civilized nature above all in the ability to cover this most difficult transition period in our history without a scuffle, without blood, without tears and sufferings of the people, for the good of our children and grandchildren, who must live neither in a large cage nor in small ones.

We can and are obligated to create such a moral, legal, sociopolitical, economic and intellectual climate in Russia that many peoples, and not just of the CIS, would consider themselves lucky to live in it.

Zhirinovskiy Deputy Calls for Increased Arms Sales

944D0018A Moscow *OBSHCAYA GAZETA* in Russian
No 14, 8 Apr 94 p 9

[Interview with Aleksandr Vengerovskiy, a leader of the LDPR and deputy chairman of the State Duma, by Leonard Nikishin: "The Red Horse Is Swimming in 'Dead Water': Zhirinovskiy's Team Is Raising the Stakes"]

[Text] In speaking of the Liberal-Democratic Party of Russia [LDPR], hardly anyone has in mind anything bigger than the figure of Vladimir Zhirinovskiy. Meanwhile, the party of many millions that was successful in the elections for the State Duma has its own elite and its own "politburo," in a manner of speaking. True, this is almost unnoticeable in the shadow of the loquacious leader. What kind of people are they? Who is behind them? What do they want and do they fully share the views of Vladimir Volfovich? In part one can obtain answers to these questions from the conversation of the reviewer of *OBSHCAYA GAZETA*, Leonard Nikishin,

with Aleksandr Vengerovskiy, one of the leaders of the LDPR and deputy chairman of the State Duma.

A regular officer and colonel in the Soviet Army, until recently he worked in one of the analytical centers of the Ministry of Defense. They also knew him in the GRU and in the Military-Industrial Commission. This predetermined the basic theme of the conversation: The fate of the domestic military-industrial complex and questions with respect to conversion of the defense industry. And although the conversation seemingly touched only on economic and production themes, one could not fail to notice that the statements of Mr. Vengerovskiy involved quite definite political approaches showing that the economy always serves politics.

[Nikishin] In the past, you dealt with defense....

[Vengerovskiy] At present as well. As long as there is something to defend.

[Nikishin] You probably have your own approach to the problems in the conversion of defense branches. Do your views coincide with Zhirinovskiy's approach? After all, he declares that it is not necessary to carry out any conversion, that our military-industrial complex must work at full capacity. And where, if you please, will its output go?

[Vengerovskiy] We presently have about 5 million people employed in the military-industrial sphere. If you take them along with their families and the infrastructures that in one way or another are working for the military-industrial complex, then it is 15 million people. On the other hand, if you look at Russia's export sphere, then 1 kilogram of a military aircraft is worth \$3,000, whereas for a civilian aircraft it is worth \$1,000. And raw materials now being exported are worth about 20 cents per kilogram. It is worthwhile to think about these 15 million people: Will they be full-value citizens and live normally or will they form an explosive social medium?

The process that we call conversion was originally incorrect, because it was based on the illusion that Russia is surrounded only by allies and friends and that they are waiting for her with open arms as a beloved member of the world community.

[Nikishin] But there are calculations and forecasts on how much military output can be absorbed by the external market. We will simply be choked by exports of this kind and we will not ensure any prosperity for the people.

[Vengerovskiy] I want to remind you that just six years ago the USSR was second in the world in the export of arms.

[Nikishin] Of which a large share was given to various friends of ours on credit.

[Vengerovskiy] It seems that your information is not very correct. To meet the state budget, it was necessary to have not only petrodollars, which by that time were

already drying up, but also other sources of revenue. And I, who worked for many years in state structures, know that the revenue came from the sale of arms. I know to which markets it went—it was the same ones that are prepared even now to take our arms if the state will assume a protectionistic position instead of pursuing false economic, military, and other doctrines, to which I also include "Partnership for Peace."

[Nikishin] And do you think that we should do this permanently? This is an abnormal structure of the economy.

[Vengerovskiy] Then I will come back with this question to you: Can the United States permanently produce arms? Despite the conversion carried out in the USSR and in Russia, it not only has not reduced its own military production but has even increased it. They are investing in new military technologies. Russia must have a geopolitical task that also includes the concept of the production and sale of arms. It must answer the question of what comes after this.

[Nikishin] Why is the United States not carrying out conversion? What, in your opinion, is the closing of the nuclear test range in Nevada all about? The weapons that have been stockpiled in the world led to just one thing: At some time they began to be used.

[Vengerovskiy] Yes, I also read Chekhov attentively. The gun that was hanging in the first act will certainly be fired in the last act. But the present local wars began not because of the accumulation of arms but because of the disruption of polarity in the world, when the second pole—the USSR—was liquidated. You see that the new world order is being established by no means with the laurels and doves of peace. Force is always used to resolve political questions. Are you trying to say that Russia should disarm? And as for Nevada, this is not serious. The Americans have already performed all the tests that they need.

[Nikishin] I am not talking about disarmament at all. But why should we return to the days of the Cold War, of blocs armed to the teeth? Do you see this as a guarantee of our future happy life?

[Vengerovskiy] No one intends to produce as much armament as there was before. We must, in the first place, produce enough military-industrial output for today's needs. Secondly, we must make weapons that correspond to contemporary warfare. Thirdly, we must supply absolutely new army structures with these arms.

[Nikishin] At the same time, just as before, other structures are just as sickly....

[Vengerovskiy] Nothing of the sort. Over the last 30 years, the military-industrial complex also produced what we call consumer goods. Everything decent that we now have in the area of household equipment was, as a rule, a development and product of the enterprises of the military-industrial complex. We do not have anything better.

[Nikishin] One might think that the military-industrial complex has inundated us with first-class household appliances. Somehow I do not recall seeing such an abundance in our stores. But let us return to the basic output of the military-industrial complex—weapons. How do you propose that we drive our competitors from the arms market?

[Vengerovskiy] This requires a policy of state protectionism. As you know, Japan and America are savage enemies when it comes to trade and markets. One has to search for another state like ours that freely admits foreign competitors into internal markets and abandons its niches in foreign markets. The corruption that first completely ate away the structures of the Soviet Union and now of Russia led to our departure from the traditional arms markets. All of this must now be put back on a normal course.

In general, if we now take the so-called psychology of "new thinking," then it is more advantageous to import all industrial products from abroad, drive American cars, and use French perfume. And what remains as Russia's share if we are not even supposed to build missiles? We consider what happened in Russia to be a mistake. We will definitely give back to our state the majesty of being a world power and its scientific-technical level.

[Nikishin] But if this scientific-technical level does not lead to an increase in the well-being of the people....

[Vengerovskiy] And you think that the standard of living of the people has improved in recent years?

[Nikishin] No, but was it really high during the Breshnev years, when everything was subjected exclusively to the interests of the military-industrial complex?

[Vengerovskiy] Can you now afford to buy an apartment, an automobile, or even a refrigerator?

[Nikishin] No. But this, with the possible exception of the refrigerator, is something that I could never afford.

[Vengerovskiy] I am very grateful to my country for the fact that I received a free education, that I have the chance to live in the apartment that they gave me at that time, and that I also made all the main purchases in my life at that time. At the present time, with my salary of 350,000 rubles as deputy chairman of the Duma, I cannot afford such purchases. This is possible for people who in the years of perestroika were able to rob the state by destroying it, establish their own private capital, and go abroad. It is quite clear who lives well in Russia now.

But let us return to the problem of the military-industrial complex. It is above all the defensive possibility of the state to hold back the onslaught of external enemies. As soon as we were deprived of it, "the enemies burned down our own hut." And you and I are standing on the burned-out site.

Gigantic investments are required to convert military production. No one will ever provide them. If the state

becomes delirious and thinks that we are surrounded by nothing but friends, then what happens is what happened with the USSR and now with Russia. There are no conversion programs in America. I have information to support this assertion. On account of my activities in the party, I head an intelligence service. With the help of plenty of Russian patriots abroad, we have complete information about what it happening and where.

[Nikishin] You spoke of the new technological level of the military-industrial complex. How do you see this?

[Vengerovskiy] It is not just the production of arms. Above all we must preserve basic science. Brains are always expensive. But there will not be any conversion until there is money for it. Otherwise this is debauchery. The state order does not exist in its previous volume but the state has not insured defense enterprises and has not provided any money for their reorientation. Give me capital investments for the renewal of equipment and machinery and I will be pleased to produce tape recorders like Sony does, to make refrigerators like those of General Motors, and to build cars better than those of Mercedes. But without working capital the plants began to simplify their production programs and to make titanium shovels and stoves, etc. In the past, we were essentially able to compete with the West in all areas of scientific-technical progress. But the CPSU, which became completely rotten from the top, let someone like Gorbachev come to power who destroyed everything as a consequence of his incompetence, to put it mildly. After him came an obkom secretary with his thinking. What else can we say? Our country deserves intelligent leaders. Professionals came to the Liberal-Democratic Party, not theoreticians in playing the accordion and not political scientists, who yesterday were asserting that communism was not far off. We are practical self-made people. And there is no reason to chuckle over Zhirinovskiy's book "Last Push to the South."

[Nikishin] No, we were not able to stand up to competition with the West. The second scientific-technical revolution by-passed us. And it did not happen in Gorbachev's time at all but much earlier. I do not want to chuckle over "Last Push," for this book evokes other feelings. For me there is a great deal there that is unacceptable.

[Vengerovskiy] Overall I am also not very pleased with it as an example of literary creativity. I was educated with other literature. But there has not been any fascism in our party, there is none, and there will be none. Fascism will appear in the country when the petty storekeepers, the so-called merchants, who have become accustomed to having a good standard of living through speculation, begin to fall into ruin. And this will certainly happen. Then they will demand the restoration of the status-quo. It is clear what idea is best for this. But this time they will not point to the Jews. They have all left.

P.S. After the conversation, Aleksandr Vengerovskiy—an absolute pragmatist and, in his own words, a practical person—gave to the correspondent of OBSHCHAYA

GAZETA several brochures that apparently are among the favorite reading material of the leaders of the LDPR and their flock. One work made up of several sections is entitled "Mertvaya voda" [Dead Water]. Its authorship belongs to some center or group of persons called the "internal predictor." The first part is called "Depressurization" and the second part "Inscription." I am not going to assess this "catechism" but I will just quote a few revelations in it that evoked a sense of dark humor in me.

"Reasoning according to **AUTHORITY—INTELLECTUAL PARASITISM**—is the primary quality of the crowd; in it one can see the striving of the crowd to live according to prepared formulas that are provided by the authorities to which it is subject.... The destruction of the **AUTHORITY TRADITION** prevailing in the crowd turns the crowd into rabble.... The crowd or rabble may be organized into structures: parliamentary, trade-union, party, etc."

"Jesus said in the Sermon on the Mount: 'Until heaven and earth pass not one jot or one tittle will in any way pass from the law (of Moses) until all shall be fulfilled.' As is clear from the quote from the 'Old Testament,' this 'all' means the global Zionist-Nazi dictatorship, which in terms of Christianity is called the 'kingdom of God on earth.'"

"The revolution was a manifestation of the depletion of the reserve of stability in terms of the depth of identity of goal vectors as a result of an unstructured closed state through the Masonry of the post-Peter 'elite' on the supra-Jewish global predictor."

"I.V. Stalin is the only one of the party 'chiefs' about whom it can be said that his education allowed him to develop his own conceptual activity."

"I.V. Stalin and some part of the group supporting him that came from the people rose in their world view above the broad popular masses and the 'elite' and attained the quality of priesthood [zhRECHestvo] (life expression [zhizneRECHEniye])."

"The leaders of the Third Reich were originally under the control of the highest suprastate Zionist Masonry."

"It is illegitimate to transfer the parliamentary experience of the West to Russia, because parliamentarianism is simply a screen over the directive-address system of Masonic mafia control."

"It is useful to reissue the work of I.V. Stalin, 'Ekonomicheskiye problemy sotsializma v SSSR' [Economic Problems of Socialism in the USSR] and those who have the opportunity should read it and think about it now."

Views of Gaydar, Others on Defense Budget

944D0013A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
9 Apr 94 p 2

[Article by Vladimir Yermolin: "Defense Budget, Benefits to Service Members: View of the State Duma"]

[Text] On Thursday the Chairman of the Committee of the State Duma for Budget, Taxes, Banks and Finances Mikhail Zadornov held a press conference whose main topic was the draft state budget for 1994. After becoming acquainted with the supplied materials, the committee concluded that the draft did not allow for the real dynamics of socioeconomic indices of the current year. In particular, in January and February the volume of production dropped not by 9 percent, as planned, but by 24 percent. What is more, the draft did not adhere to the priorities of economic policy proclaimed in the presidential message. And finally, a number of documents, without which the Duma members did not think it possible to accept responsibility for adopting such a budget, had not been submitted. The committee will recommend to the Duma that it take into consideration the budget report of the Government of the Russian Federation and continue work only after the described deficiencies had been corrected.

Regarding the defense budget, all factions without exception are talking about it today. And in particular the leader of the "Vybor Rossii" [Choice of Russia] faction Yegor Gaydar has his own opinion about military expenditures. Responding to a question from a KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent, he stressed that the faction will favor the adoption of that version of the defense budget which was submitted today by the government of the Russian Federation. As Gaydar stated, "Today in the defense budget there are no surface reserves" allowing it to be reduced solely at the expense of the Defense Ministry. However, the leader of "Vybor Rossii" believes that "a long-term program of military reform and long-term program of reductions in the Armed Forces is required." In the future, Gaydar sees a reduction in military expenditures through structuring of the Armed Forces and reduction in military units "which today are undermanned and therefore not combat ready."

However, Yegor Gaydar's position is not fully shared by his colleagues in the faction or by the Chairman of the Defense Committee Sergey Yushenkov. He stated to the KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent that he would try to obtain ratification of the defense budget "at least at the 1993 level." But the present proposed level of defense expenditures, as you know, is less than last year.

The press has stated that a number of ministries are insisting on revision of the benefits list for service members. In the press service of the Government of the Russian Federation, it was reported that at the last session of the government, this question was not raised, and it is still not known whether the question will be considered next Thursday. However, the position of the

departments which are forced to pay for a number of benefits granted to service members by the RF Law "On the Status of Service Members" partially from their own pockets has been and remains unchanged: Such benefits should be paid from the federal budget. This is understood by all, but the "damned question" of money (which apparently the state, it turns out, does not have for the adopted law) stirs up public opinion and heats up passions. The departments do not want to pay benefits to the army at their own expense. The Defense Ministry does not have a kopeck for this purpose. The federal budget, with which all agree, is not made of rubber either. What is the solution?

They are searching for it, including in the State Duma. Sergey Yushenkov said that the question will be considered at a session of the Defense Committee. The Duma members have different approaches to the question. Yushenkov himself wants to continue seeking implementation of the "benefits" articles of the law and ensure their financing with a concrete line in the federal budget.

Nikolayev Becomes Member of Security Council

944D0017A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
19 Apr 94 p 1

[ITAR-TASS article under the "Novosti" rubric: "Border Troops Commander Becomes RF Security Council Member"]

[Text] The RF President's Press Service has reported that Boris Yeltsin has issued a decree appointing Colonel General Andrey Nikolayev, Russian Federation Border Troops commander, a member of the RF Security Council.

Grachev Meets with Rabin

944D0033A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
29 Apr 94 p 1

[Article by ITAR-TASS correspondent Yuriy Tyssovskiy: "Meeting in the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation"]

[Text] Moscow, 29 Apr—Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation Pavel Grachev emphasized a significant congruence of the Russian and Israeli military doctrines after talks with Yitzhak Rabin, prime minister and minister of defense of Israel. The meeting lasted more than an hour.

Pavel Grachev noted the importance of comprehensive cooperation, including military, between Russia and Israel. Of course, he said, after the first meeting we could not examine in detail the possibilities that are opening up to us. But there is already a mechanism to put these plans into effect: An Israeli military attache has begun to operate in Moscow and the staff of the Russian military attache in Israel will go to work in Israel at the end of April or beginning of May. We will entrust them with the elaboration of the corresponding program. As minister

of defense, our guest asked me to make an official visit to Israel and there we will sketch the outline of our future bilateral relations in the military area.

The prime minister of Israel declared that the Russian leadership and above all President of Russia Boris Yeltsin assured him of Russia's striving to achieve peace in the Middle East. That same striving is something that we share, I. Rabin said, although we have different ties and relations with third countries. But when the goals are identical, the corresponding interests arise, which, I hope, will lead to the successful conclusion of Arab-Israeli negotiations.

Grachev 7 May Press Conference

944D0024A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
7 May 94 p 1

[Article by Col. Oleg Falichev: "The Main Thing Is Combat Readiness: Press Conference of the Minister of Defense"]

[Text] The Armed Forces of Russia have an anniversary on 7 May 1992: It is two years since the beginning of their formation. That is enough time to summarize results and to talk about problems and prospects.

This is really what was discussed at the press conference in the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, where Minister of Defense Gen. of the Army Pavel Grachev spoke to Russian and foreign journalists.

"Two years is truly a short time," he said. "But for military people these years were extraordinarily filled with doings. In this time we realized very clearly the kind of responsibility that the army has. For this reason, one of the main results of its formation is this: The armed forces are a dependable institute of the state and the guarantor of its security. Real patriots of the motherland are now serving in the army under these difficult circumstances. They serve in accordance with their conscience and not for rubles and dollars. The truth is this: Whatever difficulties Russia may experience, the armed forces will retain their combat capability and will remain controllable. I thank the officers, generals, and soldiers for this."

The main task today, the minister of defense stressed, is to support the army and navy at a level of combat readiness that guarantees the defense of the state under any conditions. And it is being fulfilled. The Strategic Nuclear Forces remain the guarantor of the security of Russia. And they will continue to be the main means of deterring the unleashing of nuclear war.

The process of establishing new force groupings is being concluded. The Mobile Forces will play an important role in them. Work is now under way in the forces to bring them up to prescribed strength.

The minister of defense gave a brief assessment of what has been done in each branch of the armed forces. He

said that the mixed principle of manpower acquisition will be retained. In 1994, for example, it is planned to accept 64,000 men in the Ground Forces. And it is planned to have 50 percent of them be contract service personnel by 1995. The minister found a shortcoming in the fact that we have not yet learned to work with this contingent. As a result, about 25 percent of the contract people had to be discharged.

As for the Air Defense Forces, about whose demise there has been much talk, they will remain. It is planned to reorganize them into Aerospace Defense Forces.

Overall the Minister of Defense had a rather high assessment of the combat readiness of the troops. The situation is best in the Strategic Missile Forces, Moscow Military District, Leningrad Military District, the GRVZ [Group of Russian Troops in Transcaucasus], and Leningrad Naval Base. Things are worse in the Pacific Fleet. The minister of defense stressed that beginning with the summer training period the armed forces will put rigid demands on the work. Two years was enough time, he said, to eliminate shortcomings and to establish efficient work. Among the problems that require a decision at the national level, Gen. of the Army Pavel Grachev named the dependable and stable financing of the armed forces, their adequate strength level, the conclusion of the troop withdrawal, and the provision of housing and facilities for the troops in the territory of Russia.

We will speak in more detail in the next issue about the problems raised at the press conference with respect to the development of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation.

STRATEGIC DETTERENT FORCES

History of Development of 'Nuclear Briefcase'

94UM0402A Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 20 Apr 94 p 8

[Interview with Shota Shotovich Chipashvili, Academy of Natural Sciences corresponding member, State Prize laureate, deputy director of Russian Academy of Sciences Institute of Problems of Information Science, by Anatoliy Pokrovskiy, date, place and occasion not specified: "What Is Behind the 'Nuclear Briefcase'?"]

[Text] This ordinary-looking attache case lately has been and is giving rise to many different rumors. It is understandable that in troubled times of cardinal changes in upper echelons of state authority, all of us would like to be sure that neither amateurish decisions, nor absurd chance, nor some maniac's evil will will be able to set in motion the nuclear ruin of mankind.

At one time this "nuclear briefcase" was created for our country's supreme leadership, permitting the final decision on use of strategic nuclear forces to be kept constantly under supreme control.

This is where our conversation began with Sh. Sh. Chipashvili, Academy of Natural Sciences corresponding member, State Prize laureate, deputy director of the Russian Academy of Sciences Institute of Problems of Information Science.

[Chipashvili] Of course, public interest in the "nuclear briefcase" can be understood, and the press also constantly "stirs up" this topic. All this is explainable by political aspects and the state level of those persons for whom the "briefcase" is intended.

Doctor of Technical Sciences M. S. Loginov, the head of this work who is presently alive and well (he received the Hero of Socialist Labor title for it), can tell much of interest about the fascinating story of this item's creation and introduction.

But from a technical standpoint, this is just a portable personal subscriber device, which is a diminutive particle of an enormous iceberg—the unified, comprehensive, automated system for command and control of the country's entire Armed Forces, created under the direction of General Designer Academician Vladimir Sergeyevich Semenikhin.

[Pokrovskiy] It follows from your words, Shota Shotovich, that the public at large knows little about such a global program and Academician Semenikhin's role in the country's history?

[Chipashvili] You are absolutely right, especially as the successful solution to this enormous national problem led to our country's attainment of strategic military inviolability.

One would like to believe that in the final account all aspects of this work gradually will find worthy, truthful and sufficiently complete coverage in the open press.

This is especially important now, when there is indiscriminate discrediting and smearing of everything previously achieved. This often is done by those who do not have a sufficiently realistic impression about much from our past, and in the best case have become casually familiar with very superficial or inferior information, on the basis of which amateurish or opportunistic conclusions and generalizations subsequently are made.

[Pokrovskiy] Just what is the Armed Forces automated command and control system?

[Chipashvili] You asked a very difficult question. It is impossible to portray the entire problem as a whole in a popular manner in a newspaper article, even in general outline.

But I am sure you will bring in for cooperation many of Academician Semenikhin's companions-in-arms who are now alive and well, and the impressive panorama of the solution to an enormous national problem gradually will come out in the pages of your newspaper.

To begin with, let us recall what kind of situation shaped up for the country's defense capability approximately in the early 1960's.

By this time atomic and hydrogen weapons had been created and were being upgraded constantly. This entire program is linked above all with the name of Academician Igor Vasilyevich Kurchatov and the collectives he headed.

Diverse means of delivering these weapons (for ground, air and sea basing) had been created and were being developed. The main program here is connected with the name of Academician Sergey Pavlovich Korolev and his collectives.

Thus a fundamentally new and at the same time paradoxical situation began to form both in our Armed Forces and in the armed forces of leading world powers.

On the one hand, the stockpiling of enormous arsenals of mass destruction weapons seemingly was making the powers strong and was creating the illusion of an enemy's instantaneous defeat with the surprise of being first to attack.

On the other hand, the looming threat of a more and more powerful enemy surprise first strike was forcing the sides to build up nuclear potentials.

The potentials of mass destruction weapons grew and the military threat to the sides increased.

This paradox could be resolved only by completing the triad—by creating an automated system for command and control of all kinds of strategic weapons which not only ensures one-hundred percent probability of a retaliatory strike, but also makes it more powerful because of a correction to initial plans, i.e., being first to attack becomes tantamount to suicide.

This last enormous amount of work was headed up in the final account by Academician Semenikhin as General Designer.

Initial interpretation of the entire upcoming enormous task of creating the Armed Forces automated command and control system was accomplished in the mid-1960's under the direction of Doctor of Technical Sciences V. V. Konashev, who later became Academician Semenikhin's first deputy and closest companion-in-arms and a Lenin and State Prize laureate. But all necessary preconditions were not yet ripe in the country as of that period for beginning wide-scale practical work on such a very large Soviet automated command and control system.

[Pokrovskiy] But this meant that not only scientific and technical problems, but also very complicated organizational problems had to be solved...

[Chipashvili] Specifically very complicated ones.

Fortunately, in those times not everything was as bad as certain indiscriminate slanderers of our past now try to represent it.

I can attest that the party CC Defense Department, the Military-Industrial Commission, and heads of all sector ministries which had been set in motion directed all this enormous, comprehensive work in solving the problem of creating the Armed Forces automated command and control system at the proper level, on a large scale and in a businesslike manner.

In all his posts (both in the party CC and in the Ministry of Defense), D. F. Ustinov devoted much attention to this problem and was its active proponent.

The Ministry of the Radio Industry was the leading ministry for the problem as a whole and bore full responsibility to the country's leadership. Deceased Minister P. S. Pleshakov put much of his energy and health into creating the Armed Forces automated command and control system, and therefore conferral of the Hero of Socialist Labor title on him for this system was a deserved assessment of his personal contribution.

Directorates subordinate to Marshal of Signal Troops A. I. Belov acted as the general client from the Ministry of Defense. Broad military, scientific and technical erudition, understanding and support of risky new solutions, readiness to assume responsibility at any level in the interests of the job, a constant desire to become personally familiar in practice with results achieved, and all this with precise, businesslike exactingness—these personal qualities of Marshal Belov played a role of deciding importance in the success of work on the Armed Forces automated command and control system.

General K. N. Trofimov, Marshal Belov's closest assistant and a person of profound erudition, great experience and highest morals, who was awarded the Hero of Socialist Labor title for this work, was a match for the Marshal. Unfortunately, he died tragically in a helicopter crash during a flight between Armed Forces automated command and control system sites.

General Staff Representative General V. P. Shutov, a champion of new principles of operational work based on modern information technologies, who was awarded the State Prize and who was an active, creative participant of the work, died with him.

The military science of command and control took a very perceptible quality leap with creation of the Armed Forces automated command and control system. The leading scientific research institute of the Ministry of Defense, together with institutes of branches of the Armed Forces and military academies, created new battle management algorithms and successfully introduced them in the system. General B. I. Strelchenko, chief of the leading institute and a doctor of military sciences, was awarded the State Prize.

An enormous volume of work was done to construct hardened rooms for command and control sites throughout the country's territory. This epopee needs a separate narrative.

Thousands on thousands of specialists worked far from home for many years on the industry's test benches and at Ministry of Defense sites. The organization headed by A. V. Myshletsov, who was awarded the Lenin Prize, was the leading organization in this process.

Specialists of different departments, different profiles, different ages and different nationalities made up those unified, friendly collectives, which were united by a sincere desire to successfully realize what had been conceived.

There was an enormous number of institutes, design bureaus and plants which took part in this work of many years and, by the way, in many former republics of the USSR. The memoirs of chief designers of branch automated command and control systems and of individual unique technical systems and articles will be interesting. The most prestigious prizes and high government awards were deservedly bestowed on the majority of these companions-in-arms of Academician Semenikhin.

The Council of Chief Designers, which included the immediate scientific-technical and organizational directors of all functional automated command and control systems, which were joined in the unified Armed Forces automated command and control system, functioned constantly under Academician Semenikhin's direction. Very much of interest also could be told both about this Council and about Academician Semenikhin's closest kindred spirits and colleagues.

[Pokrovskiy] Everything you enumerated indicates that journalists still owe a great debt and must cover this little-known page of our history more fully.

[Chipashvili] It is desirable that Academician Semenikhin's companions-in-arms and colleagues who are alive and well and who possess the full scope of historical information publish their memoirs about the very useful and instructive experience of creating such an enormous automated command and control system. For work on the Armed Forces automated command and control system essentially permitted forming a powerful, world-class domestic school on all aspects of comprehensive automation of the process of command and control of heterogeneous structures.

It should not be forgotten that unified thematic and engineering solutions on a world level were worked out in developing and realizing the Armed Forces automated command and control system which, in addition to their direct purpose, are suitable for use at the present time in creating automated systems for management of regions, sectors and the entire national economy of the country as a whole. What has been built up must not be lost!

[Pokrovskiy] We have been speaking all the while of the problem as a whole. Couldn't you tell briefly about something more specific?

[Chipashvili] Insofar as I can, I will try.

Everything that was realized in creating the Armed Forces automated command and control system was rather revolutionary both for the Armed Forces and for the country's science and engineering. But even against this background, the development and creation of the data exchange system for the Armed Forces automated command and control system on a fundamentally new conceptual and scientific basis was such a revolutionary and risky measure that it still generates a feeling of surprise, admiration and pride in our science and engineering.

Based on his own experience of creating automated command and control systems for individual branches of the Armed Forces, Academician Semenikhin understood well that data transfer questions were assuming ever greater importance in the problem of command and control.

Based on this, Academician Semenikhin gave constant, steady attention to the problem of creating a data exchange system as the basis of a unified Armed Forces automated command and control system.

Specialists realized from the very beginning that it was impossible to create such a comprehensive Armed Forces automated command and control system with the old approach to questions of data transfer—not only would requisite characteristics not be achieved, but the number of communications channels also had to be so enormous that it would exceed the bounds of what was reasonable. Ever larger staffs and command and control facilities must turn into enormous communications centers, with all ensuing consequences.

And proposed ideas of creating a data exchange system for the Armed Forces automated command and control system based on principles of switching individual portions of information through special automated centers seemed so unusual, unpredictable and risky for that time that far from everyone (even specialists) was agreeable to making the fate of the entire Armed Forces automated command and control system dependent on the possibility of realizing these new ideas.

It should be recalled here that all this occurred long before the accumulation of world experience and the appearance of international recommendations on a similar problem, which subsequently resulted in the enormous labor of large collectives of highly qualified specialists from different countries. Our developers not only had to develop very complex data exchange procedures for the first time on their own, but also ensure fulfillment of unprecedentedly high demands on the quality of data transfer with the use of essentially all types of communications channels, often of very poor quality, over enormous territories.

Despite all these difficulties, a large-scale territorial data exchange system was developed and realized for the first time based on a fundamentally new ideology, with unique indicators of functioning reliability and of the validity and probability of communicating data, a system which became a highly reliable, unifying foundation for all systems and subsystems of the Armed Forces automated command and control system.

When actual quantitative indicators of functioning of the data exchange system had been generalized for the first time, even the developers were pleasantly surprised. It was for a more understandable report to state leaders that the famous comparison which Academician Semenikhin very much loved was calculated: Reliability of data transfer over the data exchange system allows the distortion of no more than one out of the total number of characters in 165 volumes (i.e., 5.5 sets) of the "Bolshaya Sovetskaya Entsiklopediya" [Great Soviet Encyclopedia].

The data exchange system also is being operated successfully at the present time, and many of its characteristics have not been surpassed to this day not only in domestic, but even in world practice.

Academician Semenikhin was very proud of the results of work on the data exchange system and highly esteemed its chief designer, his deputy, Russian Academy of Sciences Corresponding Member I. A. Mizin, who was awarded the Lenin Prize for this work.

[Pokrovskiy] I had occasion to meet Vladimir Sergeyevich and prepare his interviews and articles for PRAVDA. Of course, the talk in them was not about military, but peaceful use of computers, particularly about the unified computer system. For some reason I did not have occasion to hear high praise of it.

[Chipashvili] Insofar as I recall, Academician Semenikhin appeared in PRAVDA, including also under a pseudonym, following guidelines of that time about maintaining secrecy.

With respect to the second part of your question, I would not like to enter into polemics, but I will express my view of the situation briefly.

No matter what was said there, all defense equipment without exception was of domestic origin. All this was done by our brains and our hands. In places we were ahead, in places we were not... On the average it was parity—in the modern world it is impossible to break ahead abruptly.

But everything that shoots, crawls, swims and flies is all domestic. And when computers began to be developed rapidly, all onboard computers [vychisliteli] (or "kompyutery," as you like) were and are only domestic.

And we were not somewhere behind in the area of fixed computers. The problem appeared when the question arose of mass production of computer equipment for command and control systems.

[Pokrovskiy] Since political points have appeared in our conversation, how do you assess the effect of the Armed Forces automated command and control system on higher politics? The fact is, results of work on the Armed Forces automated command and control system could not remain unnoticed in other countries...

[Chipashvili] The system's capabilities for giving political and military leaders timely information for making important decisions on a retaliatory strike and the real-time realization of these decisions with any effect of the attacking side all led to the suicidal nature of the idea of a first strike.

[Pokrovskiy] What would you like to say in conclusion?

[Chipashvili] Just one thing. Large-scale, epoch-making problems also require corresponding directors, and as a rule they become inseparable from one another in history. I would like to express the assurance that Academician Semenikhin as a person and his work to create the unified Armed Forces automated command and control system will find worthy coverage in our press and literature.

GROUND TROOPS

Percentage Breakdown of Draft Deferments

944D0012A Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
20 Apr 94 p 1

[Article by Nikolay Poroskov: "Fall Draft Ends in March; What Will Spring Draft be Like?"]

[Excerpt] Yesterday's issue of KRSNAYA ZVEZDA published the edict of the Russian Federation President "On Drafting Citizens of the Russian Federation for Military Service in April-June 1994, and on Discharging Privates, Seamen, NCOs, Petty Officers and Military Construction Workers Having Served the Established Term of Military Service." On 15 April of this year the defense minister signed the corresponding order. These documents will evoke joy in some, and anxiety over a son's soldierly fate in others. For workers of mobilization offices and military commissariats they mean the beginning of another period of hard work, full of worries and, sometimes, unresolved problems.

In recent years the draft has become a painful point for the country, a point of intersection of often diametrically opposed interests of different people and departments. And the main purpose of this matter of statehood—providing for the country's defense—has faded somewhere back into second or third priority.

The fall draft of last year essentially dragged on into February and March of this year. Of course in the official terminology of military commissariats the draft ended

on 31 December 1993, followed by a period of assignment of the recruits to the forces. But for practical purposes this has all obviously been a single continuous period.

The causes of this unprecedented phenomenon are known: Almost 80 percent of draftees received deferments from service—50 to continue their studies, 23 for health reasons, 4 for work in the arts, education and public health, and 3 because of their family situation. Seventy thousand potential draftees are on the run. Consequently last year less than 22 percent of persons on the draft rolls were drafted. For comparison, in neighboring Finland this figure is equal to 90.

Through the efforts of the Main Organizational and Mobilizational Directorate of the Main Staff, of workers of the military commissariats and draft boards, and of representatives of the heads of local administrations, at the beginning of this year we were able to achieve a turning point in this negative trend: Eighty percent of the planned number of draftees were already in the army and navy. By the end of March, the figure increased. [passage omitted]

CBW Reconnaissance Version of BTR-80

944D0007A Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
22 Apr 94 p 2

[Article by Vladimir Berezko under the rubric "The Arsenal": "A Chemical Laboratory Under Armor"]

[Text] Those who once served in subunits of the chemical troops will remember the equipment used for conducting radiation and chemical reconnaissance, of course. It consisted of the corresponding model of a BRDM [armored radiation patrol vehicle] or Uazik. The new chemical reconnaissance vehicle (RKhM-4) is based on the BTR-80.

The RKhM-4 is capable of conducting radiation and chemical reconnaissance in difficult topographical and meteorological conditions day or night. It is adapted for surmounting natural and artificial obstacles and water barriers. It performs reconnaissance effectively in temperatures of -40 to +40 degrees C and at altitudes of up to 3,000 meters.

The equipment on the RKhM-4 makes it possible to measure the gamma-radiation level in an area and the degree of radioactive contamination of various objects and to perform constant, automatic monitoring of the air. It can also perform a large number of other missions to provide a complete and comprehensive assessment of the radiation and chemical situation.

In peacetime the RKhM-4 can be used for reconnoitering the situation along main pipelines and for mopping up following the dumping of radioactive or chemical substances.

Technical Specifications of RKhM-4	
Speed at which reconnaissance can be carried out (km per hour):	
radiation	30
chemical	10
Length of continuous operation without replenishment of expandable supplies (hours)	24
Crew size	3

AIR, AIR DEFENSE FORCES

Prudnikov: PVO as Basis for Creation of Aero-Space Defense

944D0014B Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
9 Apr 94 p 3

[Interview of Colonel-General of Aviation Viktor Prudnikov by Aleksandr Ivanov, place and date not given: "Air Defense Troops Will Be the Basis for Creation of an Aerospace Defense"]

[Text] On the eve of a military professional holiday we traditionally talk about the problems, concerns, and affairs of the "birthday boys." That is why our correspondent met with the CINC of the Air Defense Troops Col-Gen of Aviation Viktor Prudnikov.

[Ivanov] Viktor Alekseyevich, what has changed in the PVO [Air Defense] Troops in the last year?

[Prudnikov] A lot has changed. These changes are associated primarily with military reform.

The Order of the President of the Russian Federation and the corresponding order of the Ministry of Defense practically gave a new face to the PVO Troops. In the future they will be the basis for creation of Russia's aerospace defense. That is a natural future, because the air and space spheres are so interrelated that they have long been viewed as an inseparable whole.

The principle of formation of the PVO system will also be changed. It will acquire a quite different content and will become territorial. Within the time periods designated by the defense minister, zones and regions of air defense will be created. It remains only to establish them legally, through the appropriate documents. I assume that this will require special study.

If we consider the specific results of combat readiness and activity of the troops, then it must be stressed that we have been able to preserve the quality and reliability of the PVO while reducing them quantitatively.

My second point is that all outmoded arms and equipment have been eliminated. Units and subunits are equipped now with the most modern and powerful systems and complexes which will make it possible to retain efficiency of use while shrinking the combat formations.

But perhaps one of the most urgent problems is the fate of those who work at radar consoles, in the cockpits of the fighter interceptors, in the missile systems. Last year was quite hard for them. As a result of the cut, thousands of officers and warrant officers were released. And although we tried, to the extent possible, to allow for the interests and desires of each, I cannot say that the process is a painless one. Even those who do not fall under the cuts begin to lose confidence in tomorrow.

This situation requires that the military council, the troop command and the cadre organs conduct purposeful work to strengthen social protection, and requires an individual approach in deciding the fate of each who is subject to the organizational personnel measures. We strive to do everything so as not to offend those who faithfully served the Fatherland for many years. We will not discharge service members without apartments.

The current material and financial support of the troops is a matter of concern. Last year we were not able to achieve regularity in payments even of pay and allowances. Even now in a number of units service members have not received their pay for March. It is hard for the families of officers and warrant officers to live under these conditions, for most of them have no other sources of income.

We are striving to distribute the money we do get as uniformly as possible. I have ordered that we first satisfy the remote garrisons, and that officer personnel receive their pay last.

[Ivanov] Viktor Alekseyevich, how then is the main mission of the PVO Troops, maintenance of high combat readiness, being accomplished?

[Prudnikov] In the near future, if we do not thoroughly correct the system for supplying the units with resources to conduct combat training in a planned fashion, then I must say bluntly that the status of combat readiness will begin to drop. By this I mean that the fliers must fly, and the missilemen and the radar operations must turn on their systems and perform their training drills and fires. Daily training must be conducted. And this is not happening today to the full extent because we don't have the resources.

Nonetheless, combat training is proceeding. For now we have tried to conduct everything that was planned for this training year, the exercises, fires, operational assemblies, and conferences in their full extent and on time.

[Ivanov] Just a year ago, monitoring of the use of Russian air space was a very serious problem. What is the state of affairs now?

[Prudnikov] Unfortunately this question has not been resolved. In order to have everything necessary to monitor the air border and the flights of aircraft through it, we must perform a great volume of work, very expensive by today's standards. The normative documents are also

necessary, to regulate the use of Russian air space. Their lack makes it harder for the PVO Troops to perform their missions.

I won't say that this state of affairs has led to any flagrant violations. Virtually everything depends on the discipline of those who pilot the aircraft. But we have already encountered incidents of violations. Not long ago we were compelled to use the on-duty air forces to force an intruder aircraft to land at Mineralnyye Vody for a customs inspection.

[Ivanov] The PVO Troops have already experienced several cuts. Now there is a new stage. But is there some sort of limit in numerical strength and the complement of the groupings beyond which the combat readiness of the troops will drop?

[Prudnikov] The minimal acceptable numerical strength of personnel and PVO groupings have been calculated. The figure was reported to the leadership of the Armed Forces. I will say that there is understanding of the problem. Now the Main Staff of the service is working on proposals to reduce the troops in such a way as not to do harm to their combat strength.

[Ivanov] In 1991, ex-president Gorbachev ordered the creation of the Strategic Deterrence Forces, to which troops of the Missile-Space Defense were assigned from the PVO Troops. As far as I know, even now there is talk of variants of a transfer of the Missile-Space Defense Troops to another Armed Service. The motivation is simple, they say these troops are not precisely working in air defense.

[Prudnikov] My opinion is not based on that fact that there is no need to transfer anything to anyone. If it helps matters, then there's nothing more to say.

But let us see how and why the Missile-Space Defense was included in the PVO system. They proceeded first of all from the fact that to ensure safe protection of the state from air and space, a strong command and control system was needed. It was created, and it works successfully. And it would not be advisable to touch anything in it today, let alone tear something out.

[Ivanov] One last question, Viktor Alekseyevich. Recently various high state and military authorities have been receiving letters in which veterans and service members have expressed their concern about the future of the PVO Troops. You have partly answered this. Still, how well-founded is their alarm?

[Prudnikov] At present a very serious and intense study is in progress to determine the structure of Russia's air defense. As far as I know, the proposals have been reasonable, well-considered, and not directed toward weakening the combat might of the PVO. But I must say the following in this regard. There is no need to sound a

false alarm, at times without knowing the actual situation, or pelting the country's and the Armed Forces' leadership with collective letters. I don't think anyone will allow the collapse of the air defense.

I want to congratulate all of those who serve in the PVO Troops, and the industrialists and contractors on their holiday, and to thank them for their selfless labor and devotion.

Russian Academy of Missile, Artillery Sciences Reestablished

944D0014A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
9 Apr 94 p 3

[News item reported by Boris Soldatenko: "More Missile and Weapons Academy Students To Be Trained"]

[Text] As reported by the press service of the Russian President, Boris Yeltsin has signed an Order "On Restoration of the Russian Academy of Missile and Artillery Sciences."

The order was signed in order to restore the traditions of Russian military science and to develop scientific research in the defense complex of the Russian Federation, and also to train qualified specialists for the Armed Forces and the defense industry.

NAVAL FORCES

Cossacks in Naval Infantry

944D0013B Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
9 Apr 94 p 4

[Interview with Vitaliy Poluyanov by Col. Valeriy Ussoltsev, place and date not given: "Changing the Saber for the Sea"]

[Text] The Ussuri Cossacks are going to serve in the naval infantry with this slogan. Perhaps a first in the centuries-long history of the Russia Cossacks. "The Cossack gallops across the valley." But now what: "Over the seas and waves, now here, tomorrow there?" It is one thing when the Cossack fights on dry land, but now he attacks from the ocean depths. Is such a thing possible?

We went with these questions to the military *ataman* of the Ussuri Cossack Troop, Vitaliy Poluyanov.

[Poluyanov] What is so surprising about it? You could put it like this: "The Cossack doesn't fear the devil or the deep." Or don't you agree? Well, let that be a joke, but seriously, what sort of times are these? A time of the highest military technology. Do you think we fight with saber and pike? Not at all, today give us Cossacks the infantry fighting vehicle, tanks, missiles, Kalashnikovs.

But then the Cossack is a special state of martial spirit, and not a prescription for a specific combat arm.

The naval infantry is the elite. These are real men. And that's what we Cossacks want to join. We have lived for three years with the idea of reinforcing the ranks of the naval infantry. And finally it has come true. Everyone has agreed, it has been arranged with the military commissariats and with the naval command. A Cossack company has been created from our draftees. Although to tell the truth, we were aiming for a battalion immediately. That didn't work out.

[Usoltsev] What prevented it?

[Poluyanov] We did it ourselves. Our boys. They have to get more fit, supplement their knowledge. The selection process for the naval infantry is very strict. But that's as it should be.

But anyway, we will work on our designated bottlenecks, as they say. We have set the goal of preparing a whole Cossack battalion of the naval infantry by autumn.

[Usoltsev] Well, how are today's draftees doing, do you have any information?

[Poluyanov] The most complete. By order of the Council of the Cossack association, *stanitsa* residents travel around to the subunits where our Cossacks are serving and check on their deeds and misdemeanors. If there are any, which God forbid, we reprimand them and hold them to a strict accounting. But in general everyone is satisfied with our Cossacks, in the motorized rifle subunits, in the missile subunits, in the Air Defense Forces, and in the border guards.

[Usoltsev] What are the goals for the future for the Ussuri Cossacks?

[Poluyanov] Forming a Cossack squadron. It would be nice to have a Cossack nuclear vessel in the ocean depths too. What are you smiling at?

The main goal, our task is to train Cossack soldiers, Cossack patriots.

That is our sacred task!

Chernomyrdin Remarks at Dedication of Destroyer 'Besstrashnyy'

944D0015B Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
19 Apr 94 p 1

[Article by Sergey Voenkov: "The Fate of Being 'Fearless' [Besstrashnyy]]"

[Text] Head of the government Viktor Chernomyrdin, First Deputy Minister of Defense of Russia Andrey Kokoshin, and Vice-Admiral Vladimir Grishanov, commander of the Leningrad Naval Base, took part in the dedication ceremony for the first warship of this class that has been launched in Russia and the raising of the Andreyev flag on it.

The last similar destroyer of the first rank was built at the "Northern Shipyard" joint-stock company back in the time of the USSR. The "Besstrashnyy" will become part of the Northern Fleet, where several such ships are already based.

Viktor Chernomyrdin noted that task of building the new Russian fleet must be resolved under extremely difficult conditions in connection with the loss of a number of military bases in the Baltic, Black Sea, and Caspian Sea and also with the complex economic situation and the difficult political circumstances.

In commenting on the raising of the Andreyevskiy flag on the destroyer "Besstrashnyy," Andrey Kokoshin said that this was a real celebration for the Armed Forces.

It was very difficult for the Ministry of Defense and the personnel of "Northern Shipyard" to complete the construction of the "Besstrashnyy" under the conditions of the extremely acute situation with respect to the financing of the state defense order, noted Andrey Kokoshin. The leadership of the Ministry of Defense continually had to follow the course of the work and provide for even financing. Presently, analogous work is being done with respect to the completion of the heavy nuclear missile cruiser "Petr Velikiy," a destroyer, and an antisubmarine ship.

INTERREGIONAL MILITARY ISSUES

Yeltsin, Kravchuk Agree on Dividing Black Sea Fleet*944D0015A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
19 Apr 94 pp 1, 3*

[Article by Vladimir Maryukha: "'Third Repartition': Will It Clear Up the Fate of the Black Sea Fleet?"]

[Text] The striving of the Ukrainian side to divide the Black Sea Fleet on an individual basis and thereby to "bury" it as an operational-strategic formation covering the southern flanks of Russia and Ukraine has already become an unfortunate tradition. The agreements signed by the leaders of the two countries in Yalta, Dagomys, Zavidovo, and Massandra, which alleviated some accumulated tension, only temporarily cooled the zeal of the Ukrainian military, who intended to have a "perhaps small but their own" fleet by confiscating the property of Russia. The fact that the Black Sea Fleet with all of its infrastructure is really Russian can be seen convincingly not only in the Massandra protocol but also in its exclusive Russian financing since September of last year.

Last Friday, after a meeting of the heads of state of the CIS, presidents Boris Yeltsin and Leonid Kravchuk also drew a line under the latest attempt at a unilateral division of the Black Sea Fleet begun by the Ukrainian special forces in Odessa. An agreement was signed on the staged settlement of the problem of the Black Sea Fleet, which contains three basic directions. The document states that the Ukrainian Naval Forces and the Black Sea Fleet of the Russian Federation will be based separately and the Ukrainian side gets 15 to 20 percent of the Fleet's ships. It is planned to prepare an agreement on the parameters of such a division within 10 days.

It was essentially a matter of the first Russian proposals on the division of the property of the former Union and the allocation to Ukraine of those ships and units of the Black Sea Fleet whose presence is adequate to resolve the tasks in the protection of the naval boundaries of the sovereign state.

On Saturday, however, a statement by Vyacheslav Kostikov, press secretary of the President of the Russian Federation, was disseminated that stressed that once again the Russian side was forced to remind people of the hard reality that was the basis of the joint document of the two presidents: "Unweighed words and actions are inappropriate when it is a matter of something that is sacred to the nation, as is the Black Sea Fleet." Is it appropriate to remind people that none of the sides must put into doubt the sincerity of the negotiating process? It turns out that it is.

Figuratively speaking, the ink had not yet dried on the signed agreement when the first alarming reports were received from Izmail, Ochakov, and Nikolayev on the violation of the spirit and the letter of the indicated document by the Ukrainian side. It is there where the

Western Naval Region of the Ukrainian Naval Forces is being organized and its Chief, Capt 1st Rank Dmitriy Ukrainetz decided "to grow into the situation in advance." A Ukrainian brigade commander—Capt. 1st Rank Yaroslav Fedorishin—has already been assigned to a brigade of river craft of the Black Sea Fleet in Izmail and the seamen have been promised high pay for swearing allegiance to Ukraine, whereas the rest will be forced to leave the boundaries of the republic. Ukraine has begun the systematic and unilateral seizure of Fleet property even before a mechanism is worked out for the division of the Black Sea Fleet as set forth by the agreement. Meanwhile, Kiev is already spreading its own interpretations of the signed document with respect to the time for which bases are leased and the places where the Black Sea Fleet will be stationed.

The times specified by the agreement for the separation of the bases to avoid conflicts between the Black Sea Fleet and the Ukrainian Naval Forces are extremely rigid, something that was not in the previous documents that left the resolution of the problem to the distant future. But the mechanism for a new "watershed" may "break down" again and again because of the unilateral actions of the Ukrainian military people, complicating the relations of the two sides. Still, one would like to believe that the time of ultimatums with which the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense entered the territory of Russian military units under the cover of the assault rifles of special forces has passed. There is a document guaranteeing this and cemented by the signatures of the leaders of the two neighboring friendly countries, and there is still a whole week remaining for the achievement of a common point of view at the level of experts and working groups on the division of the Black Sea Fleet. The purpose is to accurately carry out the achieved agreements in the localities. This must be clear, above all, to the Ukrainian military people, who are presently not called upon to show any "initiative" in the interpretation of the agreement signed by their commander-in-chief.

BALTIC STATES

Composition, Problems of Estonian Armed Forces*944D0011A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
20 Apr 94 p 2*

[Article by Vladimir Ubran, "Short-Lived Militia"; "The Estonian Army is Seeking Allies, the 'Kaytseliyt' Enemies"]

[Text]

Military Review

The defense forces of the Estonian Republic include regular armed forces (2.5 thousand men), and a militarized volunteer organization, the "Kaytseliyt" (roughly 6.5 thousand members) and the security services of the state. In turn the state security services consist of the border troops (4 thousand men), the rescue service, and the coastal defense.

We Monitor Everyone, Even the Police

When creating its own army, the Estonian government put the "Kaytseliyt" in first place. Only now have they acknowledged their error.

The "Kaytseliyt" (Defense League) is an organization which appeared in the capacity of people's militia back before the war. It was restored in 1990. In the autumn of the same year it conducted an exercise to restore the prewar border of Estonia, digging in border barriers on foreign territory in the Leningrad oblast. In 1991-1993, the militiamen launched several armed attacks on Russian service members in the Estonian Republic.

When the volunteers "implemented" slogans having to do with fighting the occupiers, this was supported in every way by the political elite. But when it became clear that the Russian Army was leaving sooner or later, another solution was found for the military patriotism of the "Defense League."

Last summer in Pullapae the volunteer *jaeger* company, which consisted of soldiers of the Karu "Kaytseliyt" force, barricaded itself in their barracks as a token of protest against the fact that the government was unable to purge the ranks of the army of the "former communists and officers of the Soviet Army." Even though the mutiny itself ended bloodlessly, shots were fired. In November, when the former commander of the Pullapae mutineers Asso Kommer was arrested, there was an exchange of fire between the police and the *jaegers*, and two policemen were wounded.

The scandal has not died down as yet. Even though recently a government commission investigating the *jaeger* affair disclosed the results of its work, the problems have not been fully eliminated. In the opinion of the commission, the conflict occurred primarily because the status of the *jaeger* company had not been defined, and for this reason the company constitutes an "alternative military unit attracting both those who are interested in bearing arms, and those who are interested in combat training outside the control of the main staff of the defense forces."

Other unsavory facts about the "Kaytseliyt" were also discovered. For example, the commission got hold of a document which indicated that the Parnu militia was conducting "counterintelligence against the municipal prefecture police." It turns out that local "Kaytseliyt" members had received the mission from their Tallinn leaders of "constantly surveilling the activities of the police."

Although the "Defense League" has many highly placed patrons, the authorities have begun to take action to eliminate the "partisan subunits." And in a future law on state defense evidently there is no mention of the "Kaytseliyt" as a military formation. Its functions will be rolled back to preparation of draftees and reservists.

Aleksander Einzeln, the commander of the defense forces and a former American colonel invited back to the motherland (where he became a Major General), is insisting on this. "The problem is that many of these boys are acting more like members of a street gang than like members of the armed forces," he commented on the situation in the NEW YORK TIMES, "and we need to get rid of the swindlers, thieves and adventurers."

What Commander Would Not Love a Fast Career

After the "strike" of the *jaeger* company, the nationalists in parliament blocked a decision on punishing the culprits. But paying no mind to the radicals, Einzeln immediately discharged around 1500 "Kaytseliyt" soldiers. And just as demonstratively, he left in service the former communist and Soviet officer Colonel Ats Laaneots, the chief of the main staff of the defense forces, against whom the volunteers had been acting.

Laaneots has retired only now, in April, when his authority officially expired. But he turned over the job to his 49-year-old deputy chief of operations, Colonel Avro Serel, who is also one of the "formers." Why did Einzeln pay no heed then to those who seem to see communists everywhere? It is simply that the defense forces require professionals. You see, now most of the Army officers are quick promotions, as they say here, from the initial period of independence. Only six percent of them have higher education, and most of the commanders have completed only a six-month training course.

But life rapidly dispelled the illusions of the first years of independence. And in this context, the interview with the commander of the Kaleva battalion, Captain Alar Laneman, published in the newspaper ESTONSKAYA ZHIZN is quite characteristic. Five officers are envisioned for each company in his battalion, but usually there is only one. And he generally has no experience in service, and cannot cope with the great loads. It is no surprise, Laneman admits, that some of them "got off track and began to push too hard." For this reason, many of the young officers were "simply shoved out" of the battalion.

Who is having as meteoric a career in Estonia as the politicians?

The 27-year-old journalist Yuri Luyk, becoming Minister of Defense after the Pullapae crisis, this January returned to his former place of work, and was confirmed as Minister of Foreign Affairs. (He began his political career in 1991, taking over a department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs). And the military department is headed by a classmate from Tartu University, Indrek Kannik, who also worked earlier at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Like Luyk, he is a deputy of the state council from the rightwing coalition party "Isamaa."

But still, one must give the young ambitious politicians their due. The task set two years ago of gradual integration into NATO is being accomplished here most actively, if one compares the efforts of all the Baltic

states. And the chief obstacle, the creation of an army on the same principles as in the West, is now starting to be overcome in Estonia.

Despite the economic difficulties, Prime Minister Mart Laar last spring with the help of the then Defense Minister Hayn Rebas, concluded a contract with the Israeli state company "Tass" for delivery of NATO-standard small arms and antitank weapons (with spare parts). The parliament easily "swallowed" the astronomical cost of the deal for the Estonian Republic, "50 million U.S. dollars, and in January of this year a ship with the first lot of foreign weapons was unloaded at the port of Tallinn.

Yuri Luyk also evidently will go down in history for announcing preparations for production of NATO caliber ammunition in the Republic. The present minister Indrek Kannik and following ones will also have their share of worries. Estonia has undertaken to pay off the sum required by the contract with "Tass" by the start of the year 2000. It is then when plans are to bring the numerical strength of the regular forces to 12 thousand, which is precisely how many can be supplied with the purchased weapons.

The Peacekeeping Battalion Is Lucky—There Is Someone to Attack

It is still hard to speak of combat readiness of the defense forces. And joining NATO is not exactly an immediate prospect. A military alliance is now possible only with the nearest neighbors, Latvia and Lithuania. The decision has already been made to form a combined peacekeeping battalion in order to then offer its services to the U.N.

And the first test of the forces was on February 20-22, when one company from each country gathered for an exercise at a range not far from Viru.

Participating were: One hundred and fifty service members from Latvia, representing a motorized rifle battalion stationed in Aluksne, 129 Estonian soldiers (Company "C" of the Kupriyanov battalion); 96 men from the Lithuanian brigade "Geležinas Vilkas" (1st Company of the Panevezys Battalion).

Against the background of numerous statements regarding preparation for peacekeeping operations, the plan of action of the future U.N. soldiers appears strange. Here is how the Estonian press describes the exercise: "The first day the combined battalion withdrew under the pressure of enemy forces . . . They (the subunits) cleanly emerged from the encirclement, and by evening the withdrawal had stopped. The next day a counterattack began which ended in a brilliant victory."

One could of course cite other details. But this is the main thing. It is thought that the goal of any peacekeeping operation is to stop fire and separate the belligerent parties. Here everything is different.

It is no accident that immediately after the Viru maneuvers, the "Kaytseliyt" leadership began to demand an "all-Estonian defensive exercise," again dragging out its slogans about the struggle with the occupiers. It is a good thing that after the results of the work of the "jaeger" commission were publicized, the enthusiasts supporting the "Defense League" decreased both in the state assembly and in the government.

The venture has collapsed. They say that after this, one of the "Kaytseliyt" leaders began work on his memoirs—a good sign that his time had passed.

Latvian Sejm Refuses to Approve Agreement With Russia

944D0007B Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
22 Apr 94 p 3

[Article by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent Sergey Knyazkov: "The Fourth Draft Is Like the Previous Fifth Point: Russian-Latvian Agreement Threatened"]

[Text] The Latvian Sejm did not approve the intergovernmental agreement with Russia on social protection for military pensioners initialed back on 15 March, despite the fact that it was undoubtedly aware of the official statement made by President of the Russian Federation Boris Yeltsin just yesterday. Among other things, it stressed the fact "we have not planned and are not planning to build military bases on Latvian territory. This has to do only with the temporary functioning of a single Russian establishment under civilian control, the radar station in the city of Skrunda". (KRASNAYA ZVEZDA covered relations between our nations in greater detail on 20 April).

Public opinion has also forced President of the Republic of Latvia Guntis Ulmanis to alter his position. He spoke out in favor of an agreement on the withdrawal of Russian troops prior to 31 August of this year, on social protection for servicemen for the period of troop withdrawal and for temporary retention of the radar station at Skrunda. Speaking of the fourth agreement, which has to do with social protection for military pensioners and their families residing in Latvia, Ulmanis proposed the establishment of a group of experts, which would continue the quest for mutually acceptable solutions for the next 10 days.

KRASNAYA ZVEZDA learned yesterday that Russian President Boris Yeltsin and Latvian President Ulmanis had reached agreement by telephone to hold a meeting in Moscow in the immediate future.

The precise date of the meeting, at which it is planned to sign the initialed agreements between the two countries, specifically the one on the withdrawal of Russian troops and rent for the radar station at Skrunda, has apparently not yet been set.

CAUCASIAN STATES

New Opportunity To 'Regulate' Karabakh Conflict

94UM0396A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
13 Apr 94 p 2

[Article by Vladimir Urban, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, under rubric "Military Review": "The Order Is To Cross the Border: Karabakh Battalions Entered Shaumyanovskiy Rayon and Azerbaijani Aviation Committed Acts of Retribution in Response"]

[Text] Negotiators at the peace talks change, but the war goes on. After the unsuccessful winter offensive by Azerbaijani troops (KRASNAYA ZVEZDA wrote about this on 30 March), a convenient moment seemingly has come again for beginning a settlement of the conflict.

But official Baku still responded with a "sovereign no" to the proposal to introduce Russian forces of separation between the belligerents and to hold talks on the political status of the unrecognized Nagorno-Karabakh Republic. And the situation again was reminiscent of a lull before

battle, especially as the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic confirms its resolve to force the enemy to reckon with it by one method—military.

Back at the beginning of last year the Karabakh Defense Staff worked out a plan together with the Armenian Main Staff for establishing so-called security zones around the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic. Operations to seize Azerbaijani territories—Kelbadzharskiy, Agdamskiy, Fizulinskiy, Zangelanskiy and other rayons—were worked out and then carried out on the basis of this plan. Judging from everything, the rapid restoration of the status quo at the front after failure of the Azerbaijani offensive added to Karabakh confidence that they would win the war. That is how the decision came to create one more "security zone," this time to the north of Karabakh.

Previously settled basically by Armenians, Shaumyanovskiy Rayon (renamed Geranboyskiy Rayon by the Azerbaijanis) covers the path to the strategically important city of Gyandzha. Major forces, particularly 2nd Army Corps, are stationed here. It is common knowledge that last year former Corps Commander Colonel Surret Guseynov used units of this corps to act against then President Abulfaz Elchibey. A change of power took place in Baku as a result.



There is a large number of refugees in Gyandzha from Kelbadzharskiy Rayon, which was occupied by Armenian troops in April of last year. In case combat operations unfold in Shaumyanovskiy Rayon, the refugees (as also happened last year) can become that spark from which there will be an outburst of discontent with Azerbaijani central authorities. There already are preconditions for this.

In March Karabakh raiding parties consisting of local Armenians came to within 40-50 km of Gyandzha. The "reconnaissance in force" was successful then, but according to reports from Stepanakert, the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic Defense Army now has liberated the villages of Talish in Mardakertskiy Rayon and Gyuristan in Shaumyanovskiy Rayon. Combat operations continue in the direction of Shaumyanovsk and the city is threatened with serious danger.

It was not by chance that Baku called the new Armenian offensive an attempt to destabilize the situation in the republic. And now, when Azerbaijani aviation has joined in the combat operations after almost a year's break, it is clear that a very important psychological point has been overcome.

During 1992-1993 Nagorno-Karabakh Republic Defense Army air defense weapons shot down over 10 enemy aircraft. There are two pilots in the Stepanakert prison (one a native of Russia, the other of Ukraine) who were shot down in the Karabakh sky. There were private understandings that they would be handed over to "interested countries" after trial if the bombings did not continue.

The Azerbaijani Air Force committed an "act of retribution" against Stepanakert and other cities of the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic on 10 April, right after two Karabakh battalions penetrated into Shaumyanovskiy Rayon. And on 12 April air strikes were delivered against the Armenian cities of Goris and Kafan.

Aerial bombings of peaceful communities of course are incapable of interfering with a continuation of the Karabakh offensive. The "Armenian occupation corps" (Baku's terminology) is conducting combat operations basically by small assault teams difficult to detect from the air. But the fact will remain a fact: The war has entered a new bloody phase.

Karabakh: Fighting Picks Up Around Geranboysk
94UM0396B Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
14 Apr 94 p 1

[Item from Baku: "The Situation Around Karabakh Has Been Exacerbated"]

[Text] OWN INFORMATION-RIA—The Azerbaijani Ministry of Defense Press Service reported that Armenian troops, committing additional subunits (1,500 soldiers) shifted from Armenia, again attempted to take built-up areas of Geranboyskiy Rayon of the Republic of Azerbaijan on the morning of 12 April.

President Geydar Aliyev appealed to the Azerbaijani people over republic television and radio to "stand up in defense of the native land."

Fighting Continues in Karabakh

944D0012B Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
21 Apr 94 p 1

[Article by Vitaliy Denisov: "Fighting Continues in Karabakh, and Each Side Attempts to Show Itself in the Best Light"]

[Text] In an interview with a KRSNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent, Murad Petrosyan, deputy commander of the army of Nagornyy Karabakh, refuted a report by the Azeri side of allegedly high losses on the part of Karabakh forces. He said that Karabakh forces are sticking with defensive tactics, and are suffering significantly fewer losses than the enemy. Last week Karabakh detachments lost several dozen men killed, while the Azeri Army lost over 600. In the words of Petrosyan, forces of the army of Nagornyy Karabakh captured 15 light armored vehicles, 8 tanks and 5 IFVs as trophies, and brought down one airplane of the Azeri air forces.

According to a statement from Petrosyan the Armenian side also possesses information indicating that Afghan mujahadin are taking part in fighting on the Azeri side east of the rayon center of Mardakert.

The Azeri Ministry of Defense evaluates its position more optimistically. In its statement it noted that the offensive has been halted in all sectors, and over the last three days the advancing troop formations lost 16 units of armored equipment in the Terter sector.

ARMS TRADE

Vladimir Arms Show Planned for Late May

944D0017B Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
19 Apr 94 p 1

[Rosvooruzheniye State Company Press Service article under the "Novosti" rubric: "Russian Arms Exhibition"]

[Text] An exhibition (to be held from 24 to 28 May) will include about 30 enterprises of the Russian VPK [military-industrial complex], which will display small arms, rocket and artillery weapons, PVO [air defense] items, and engineer equipment.

The exhibition is being organized by the Golden Gates of Russia Vladimir-Suzdal International Fair AO [joint-stock company]. Visitors will be able to speak with representatives of the Rosvooruzheniye State Company and discuss purchasing of weapons and military equipment.

Russia Losing Arms Market

944D0004A Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA
in Russian No 78 (754), 26 Apr 94 p 4

[Article by Sergey Akshintsev: "Russia Losing the Arms Market: USA Already Exporting Seven Times More"]

[Text] The arms trade problem has recently acquired special urgency, as a result of which the mass media report on it practically daily, evoking numerous discussions and debates.

In the discussion of the question as to whether or not Russia should sell arms, one is astounded by the simplicity with which many of our citizens approach this complex, delicate problem. Having digested a certain amount of superficial information, and not burdening themselves with a meticulous, comprehensive analysis, in all seriousness they offer proposals which not only possess content that often recalls the line of reasoning followed by Manilov in Gogol's *Dead Souls*, but which may also lead to serious negative consequences.

In the estimation of the Ministry of Defense, the USA's share of the world arms market is currently around 60 percent. However, citing available official international data, Doctor of Historical Sciences A. G. Arbatov, a prominent specialist in security matters, asserts that of the total volume of world arms exports, which was \$18 billion in 1992, the USA's share was approximately \$8 billion, or only 46 percent.

How correct are these estimates, and which is closer to the truth?

Of course, the differences in the indicators are the product of different procedures for calculating them, and there is nothing prejudicial in this. Something else is important—correct manipulation of data obtained by means of some specific methodological approach, and a clear understanding of their limits.

Having no information on the procedure by which the volumes of arms exports by different countries were estimated by specialists of the Ministry of Defense, we need to offer some clarifications regarding estimates of the world arms trade volume and the USA's share of it.

The principal data were obtained from an analytical survey of armament and disarmament problems covering 1993, prepared by specialists of the Stockholm International World Problems Research Institute (SIPRI). There can be no doubt as to the high professionalism and objectivity of this well-known organization's scientists. And as with anyone concerned with maintaining one's scientific image, SIPRI specialists accompany the cost indicators of world arms trade volumes cited by them by the corresponding methodological explanations.

It follows from these explanations that the data reflected in the SIPRI survey embrace only five basic forms of conventional arms: Warplanes and helicopters; armored equipment and artillery systems of 100 mm and higher caliber; radar stations and other electronic systems (tracking, control, guidance etc.); guided missiles; ships of the principal classes (with displacement greater than 100 tonnes). That is, export and import of forms of armament such as ammunition, infantry weapons, artillery armament of up to 100 mm caliber, military launches etc. are disregarded.

Considering the complexity and the practical impossibility of clearly tracking deliveries of this assortment of military property, SIPRI specialists make special reference to their well-known table, which contains data on the world trade volume.

In the meantime when he cites SIPRI data but fails to mention this reference, Mr. A. G. Arbatov unwittingly reduces the real volume of arms trade in the world, and the roll played in it by the USA. An estimate of the difference may be obtained by comparing the SIPRI estimate with indicators contained in a special annual report written by the research service of the U.S. Congress on deliveries of conventional arms to Third World countries.

Thus according to the last report, which accounted for all deliveries of American arms through state and private channels, in 1988-1992 the USA exported weapons and military equipment to developing countries amounting to \$36.2 billion in current prices. Considering that according to SIPRI data Third World countries represented only 36 percent of American exports of the main forms of conventional arms in the indicated period, and making the assumption that this proportion also applies to deliveries of other types of military property abroad, we find that total exports of weapons and military equipment by the USA in 1988-1992 were approximately \$100 billion. In the meantime, we see an indicator of only \$55 billion in the SIPRI survey; however, it corresponds only to that part of armament which the

USA supplies to other countries. Thus, one of the indicators exceeds the other by 82 percent.

With regard for this, and ignoring the nonessential error due to differences in prices observed in the Congressional report and in the SIPRI survey, and adopting an average coefficient of excess for the entire five-year period, we find that American arms exports in 1992 exceeded \$15 billion.

Why cite all of these complex calculations, which are tiresome to the reader and which aren't commonly found in newspapers as a genre? To once again demonstrate to our people that we continue to approach arms trade, which is such a complex problem, in a very superficial way, without accounting for the evolving realities. As a result, while we were waging a campaign of directive and, in many ways, unilateral conversion, and debating whether Russia should sell arms or not, the leading foreign military exporters, chiefly in the USA, began building up the efforts to increase their exports, including by penetrating into markets abandoned by us. As a result, a significant imbalance revealed itself in world arms trade, which was pointed out in particular by Russian President B. N. Yeltsin in his report to a joint meeting of the Council of the Federation and the State Duma in February 1994.

Thus, while according to calculations the volume of American arms exports exceeded \$15 billion in 1992, this indicator was only \$2.3 billion for Russia (taken from the cited report to the U.S. Congress, and corresponding to our arms exports to Third World countries, because for practical purposes there were no deliveries to other countries in 1992). Indicators contained in the United Nations conventional arms register also attest to presence of such a large imbalance in the volumes of American and Russian exports of weapons and military equipment (a factor of more than seven times, and not the four times arrived at when using SIPRI data). Corresponding with this, in 1992 the USA exported 1,241 tanks (82 percent of world exports), 706 IFVs and APCs (63 percent), 166 large-caliber artillery systems (17 percent), 165 warplanes (69 percent) and 6 helicopter gunships (75 percent). Of these types of arms, Russia exported only 7 tanks (0.5 percent), 198 IFVs and APCs (18 percent) and 26 warplanes (11 percent).

The Soviet military-industrial complex was distinguished by a high potential in relation to creating and exporting defensive products, permitting it to successfully compete in the world arms markets. However, the USSR's disintegration significantly weakened this potential.

First, in the heat of the infighting that engulfed us, and desiring to reach the finish line first, we began pursuing an uncoordinated arms export policy, and developing ill-conceived competition, which is ultimately leading to serious political and economic losses for all parties. In particular, when the same types of equipment are aggressively offered in the same markets, their prices decrease.

Second, disturbance of the unified military-economic space seriously undermined our possibilities for designing state-of-the-art, competitive arms. Because of nondelivery of certain units and parts by some neighboring sovereign state it is impossible to manufacture and export entire weapon systems. Even Russia suffers this fate in some cases, despite the fact that it possesses the most powerful military-industrial base in the CIS. A meeting with the director of a certain defense enterprise comes to mind in this connection. When asked about seeking new export orders, he replied that he wasn't especially troubled by this (there was a demand for his products), and that the main problem was filling the orders already placed, which was jeopardized by violations of cooperative deliveries.

This negative factor elicits serious apprehensions among our potential customers regarding the ability of CIS exporters to ensure dependable post-sales maintenance of the delivered weapon systems, which is extremely important to successful activity in the world arms market.

As a result of these and a number of other causes, some countries that have been traditional importers of Soviet armament are starting to actively seek alternative sources of deliveries. For example India, which was the biggest purchaser of Soviet armament (the latter represented 80 percent of India's military imports in 1987-1991), has been developing military and economic cooperation with Western countries in recent years, thus attempting to insure itself against possible failures of military deliveries from CIS states. Concurrently, capitalizing on the problems in our military-industrial complex, arms exporters in Eastern Europe are also rushing into the Indian market. For example, during a recent visit to Delhi by a high-placed Hungarian military delegation, it was announced that Hungary was prepared to supply India with spare parts and equipment for MiG airplanes as well as for T-55 and T-72 tanks.

Unfortunately, many of us who are concerned about proliferation of arms in the world believe the main threat in this sphere to be coming from the Russian military-industrial complex, which is striving to sell its state-of-the-art, competitive defensive products in the foreign market. But this is a deeply mistaken position, inasmuch as the solution to this problem must be approached under the conditions of strict parity, with all of the principal exporters and importers involved. Otherwise, tensions in certain regions of the world would not be reduced, inasmuch as other countries would deliver weapons there. In the meantime, not only will we fail to earn additional hard currency necessary to reform the Russian economy, but under the conditions of limiting defense orders to our own armed forces, ultimately we will transform from an arms exporter into an arms importer.

DOCTRINAL ISSUES

Makarevskiy on Prospects for Military Reform

94UM0400A Moscow OBSHCAYA GAZETA in Russian
No 13/38, 1 Apr 94 p 8

[Article by Major General (Retired) Vadim Makarevskiy, Russian Academy of Sciences World Economics and International Relations Institute Disarmament and Security Department, under rubric "We and Our Expectations: Militaria": "Military Reform Is Proceeding, But More Slowly Than One Would Like"]

[Text] Military reform in Russia is not someone's whim. It is an objective necessity, a response to changes which occurred in Europe and the former Soviet Union over the last 5-6 years.

Back during 1989-1990, when sharp debates were going on about professionalization of the Army, when former heads of the Ministry of Defense flatly denied the need for conducting military reform, it essentially already had begun...

Its beginning was marked by the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Warsaw Pact member countries. Events were accelerated further by the dissolution of this military-political organization, reaching their culmination in 1991, when the Soviet Union itself disintegrated and the Russian Armed Forces were deprived of a strategic second echelon (the Baltic, Belarus, Ukraine). Thus, Russia's strategic troop grouping had to be created anew, and this, strictly speaking, is one of the main components of military reform.

Attempts to defend unified Union Armed Forces and then create unified CIS forces proved fruitless, and so establishment of a Russian Army and simultaneously the planned reform of existing military structures began in May 1992. The basic goal of military reform is a quality improvement in the Army under new geostrategic conditions, with consideration of Russia's new military doctrine and the reduction in troop numerical strength to optimum size. Its realization (difficult in itself) is taking place against the background of a sequence of problems, each of which also is rather complicated. It is the scheduled (and sometimes also unscheduled, but in any case massive) withdrawal of troops from abroad, the significant reduction in authorized personnel strength, the great personnel shortage in the troops, destruction of excessive combat equipment under the Paris Agreements, and conversion of military industry.

The principal difficulties of Armed Forces reform lie in this interlacing of problems being resolved simultaneously in a country experiencing political and economic crisis. They are exacerbated by the situation in countries of the near abroad—military conflicts in the Caucasus, Central Asia and Moldova, into which Russian troops have been drawn in one way or another.

The military reform plan was designed for 8-9 years and broken into three stages. We now are in the second stage (1993-1995).

Its task of creating a new strategic grouping of troops should be completed next year.

The next military reform task is to upgrade the intra-branch structure of troops in connection with the change in their stationing and the reduction in overall numerical strength of the Armed Forces to the level of two million persons, and to upgrade weapon and command and control systems (in particular, this means a transition from the "army-division" system to a "corps-brigade" system).

A reduction in troop numerical strength requires improved professional training of personnel. A serious problem arose over troop manpower acquisition, which can be solved only by combining a conventional call-up with acceptance of soldiers on a volunteer, contract basis. This problem is difficult to resolve. There are difficulties with the call-up because of the great indulgences established at one time by the former Supreme Soviet (essentially only one-fifth of the overall number of potential draftees enter the Army). Not everything is simple with acceptance under contract as well. The numerical strength of NCO's and contract privates was supposed to be 30 percent in 1993, but this is only half fulfilled. On the one hand, there is a clear lack of funds. On the other hand, contract personnel want both to receive a decent salary and to have easier service—basically logistic and maintenance positions are being filled. Considerably fewer are willing to take combat positions.

Creation of mobile forces is an important element of military reform. At first the thought was to create two large groupings of mobile forces—Immediate Reaction Forces as a first echelon ready to act in a matter of hours, and Rapid Deployment Forces as a second echelon consisting of formations with heavier equipment (the numerical strength of each grouping is up to 100,000-150,000 persons). It was planned to establish these forces in two military districts, Volga and Ural. The idea of creating such large mobile forces was connected with the fact that Russia now is incapable of keeping large troop groupings along all its immense borders. They began creating the mobile forces in 1993, but the initial plan now is being transformed. It is possible that the central mobile forces will be of lesser makeup, but on the other hand small mobile forces will be established in all military districts, above all Moscow, North Caucasus and others.

Of course, there were mobile forces in the makeup of the Soviet Armed Forces previously as well—above all these were the Airborne Troops and units of the Naval Infantry. The novelty of the present mobile forces concept lies in the fact that they must be interbranch in

nature, have a wider range of weapons and have the capability of performing major operational-strategic missions independently.

One other element of military reform is a reform of troops on a territorial basis. By 1995 it is planned to establish the Joint Territorial Command headed by a commander-in-chief (in the rank of deputy minister of defense) in Komsomolsk-on-Amur. The goal is more effective command and control of all forces and assets in the Far East, including not only the Ground Troops, but also the Pacific Fleet, Air Force, Air Defense, and if necessary the Border Troops and Internal Security Forces. Then it is planned to set up such a command in Ulan-Ude for centralizing command and control in the Transbaykal and in Siberia. Reform of military structures in the North Caucasus was announced even earlier. This means that territorial commands operating within limits of certain territories of Russia and heading up the reform of Russian troops are being established in place of previous commanders-in-chief of axes, which in terms of operational purpose basically were aimed at the West. (They supported the command element of border military districts and groups of forces abroad). One can see in this the beginning of reorganization of branch structures of the Armed Forces. But a reform of branch structures is a very complicated matter. For example, an attempt to create unified Air Defense Forces based on Air Defense Troops and the Air Force in Ukraine ended in failure. The new command and control entity which had been established, numbering 250 generals, officers and warrant officers, was disbanded and everything returned to square one.

Finally, one of the most important tasks of military reform is to elevate the professional level of Armed Forces personnel. But as we already said, there are considerable difficulties here which cannot be overcome in a year or two. Draftees must come into the Army better trained and more mature. The viewpoint of a number of authoritative military persons who insist on raising the draft age to 19-21 is quite correct. Eighteen years is too "green" an age for military service. A draftee should begin service no earlier than age 19 and a volunteer from age 21, while also having all other qualities of a professional soldier (appropriate physical development, necessary level of education and so on).

There is a mass of objective and subjective difficulties in the path of military reform in Russia. I will risk declaring that not one major military power of modern time, nor Russia itself in the past, conducted military reforms under such difficult conditions in which the present Russian Federation now finds itself.

Reform unquestionably is under way, however, although not as fast or as vigorously as one would like. But the important thing still lies ahead: With a favorable development of events, a qualitative renewal of Russian Federation Armed Forces will materialize no earlier than 1996.

Gareyev Calls for More Attention to Military-Scientific Thought

94UM0407A Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 4, 1994 (signed to press 14 Mar 94) pp 24-28

[Article by General of the Army M.A. Gareyev, doctor of military sciences and professor; Colonel (Ret) P.N. Bobylev, candidate of historical sciences and docent; Captain 1st Rank (Ret) P.M. Shabardin, candidate of philosophical sciences; and Major-General S.I. Syedin, doctor of psychological sciences and professor: "A Conceptual Breakdown or Defamation the Past (On the Development and Problems of Russian Military Science)"]

[Text] Major changes in the world also largely affect military affairs, including problems of military history and practice.

Above all, I want to express concern over the decrease in interest of leaders of the Armed Forces and many officers in methodological problems of military science. Something is also being developed now. Fresh ideas are also being born. But a not entirely good tendency of isolating scientific thought from practical activities is emerging.

This also happened in the past, when much was determined a priori by political guidelines and the demand for new knowledge and ideas was rejected. However, today, unfortunately, this no longer involves only big leaders. At a recent conference of historians, we did not see even representatives of the editorial staff of the Military Encyclopedia, who more than others should be interested in a professional discussion of their problems. Such an arrogant self-isolation will in time make itself felt by a decrease in the quality of their labor and can be reflected in the accomplishment of tasks facing the Armed Forces of Russia.

A conclusion suggests itself. It is necessary, in my view, to attract more decisively the attention of the public and leading military personnel to this problem; constantly and on a high professional level show what specifically is being overlooked now due to underestimation of new ideas; and more thoroughly develop new scientific ideas and submit them for discussion by experts and the public.

A second problem that bothers me concerns sciences studying defense problems and war as a whole. Seemingly, scientific thought has convincingly proven that military science alone cannot study war as a complex socio-political phenomenon. By studying armed struggle alone, one cannot understand the essence and origin of wars. To do this, one must comprehend such matters as a society's economic system, processes of the birth of classes, the causes of contradictions between states, and so forth. But this, as we know, is not the subject of military science.

Before, in socialist countries it was customary to believe that general problems of war were revealed in the Marxist-Leninist doctrine on war and the army; other doctrines on war were ignored. Thus, the object and subject of knowledge narrowed substantially, and many very complex phenomena had to fit into the methodological framework of one doctrine alone. I am confident that war, like any other phenomenon, can be studied objectively by studying all doctrines and theories directly or indirectly concerning it, adopting the best that is in them. In Western countries, the science studying the general problems of war (its essence, origin, sociopolitical and economic fundamentals of military might, the army's role and place in society, and so forth) is called the study of war. In discussing these problems at the conference of historians, O.A. Belkov said that they could study military politology. It was planned to legitimize the concept of "philosophy of war" or "general theory of war." But these terms, in my view, do not fully express the essence of the problems.

Military politology is legitimate only as a component part of general politology. But in the cognition of war one encounters not only political but also philosophical, economic, and social problems. Thus, general knowledge about war can be known based on comprehensive studies of various sciences. The term "general doctrine on war and the army" is more accurate.

Now about the topic of military science. Recently, people have appeared who have poor knowledge about the essence of the question they are trying to interpret in their own way.

There are opinions about the need to include in the topic of military science political and economic problems and knowledge of other sciences (physics, cybernetics, geography, and others). The article "What Is Military Science?" was published in the journal VOYENNAYA MYSL. In particular, the author writes that to solve the "entire set of problems facing military science, it is necessary to know...economic, social, ecological, demographic, and other aspects of war, and the corresponding sections of military science engage in this." It further emphasizes: "It is known that whereas a field of knowledge has an object and subject for cognition and its own laws, this is a science according to all parameters, and the social order for knowledge of this science determines its affiliation—in this case military."¹ It must be said that we have not encountered for a long time now any examples of a more dense ignorance in our military press. If you assume that such an approach would be adopted by science, this would give rise to complete confusion in classification of scientific knowledge.

Indeed, it is necessary to know and take into account the economic, ecological, and other aspects of war. The Ministry of Defense needs knowledge gleaned from various sciences, and military science uses it. This is the essence of interaction and mutual penetration of sciences. But it is impossible and illegitimate to include

physics, mathematics, and other fields of knowledge in military science just because they are used in military affairs.

People who react so frivolously to resolving methodological problems do not understand that sciences must not be classified arbitrarily. They differ primarily according to the subject for cognition and those objective phenomena and laws which they are able to experience.

Warfare, armed forces, methods of preparing and conducting combat operations by them in modern conditions, taking into account prospects of development, are the subject of military science.

War and armed struggle are a two-sided phenomenon in which both sides deal with common laws, principles, and objective phenomena. Therefore, military science is unified, and its previous division into "Soviet" or "bourgeois" is artificial.

Openness of military science, military cooperation with other countries, and exchange of knowledge are important today. Unfortunately, recently we have stopped publishing military literature in general, and books by foreign authors are not being translated or published, although even during the "stagnant" years we had the opportunity to read Manstein, Guderian, Eisenhower, and others. We need to know foreign military literature. Without this we cannot acquire full-fledged military knowledge. I would also like to express the desire that questions of methodology of military theory and practice be studied more thoroughly at military academies and thus increase the overall culture of the officer corps. Moreover, it is impossible to plan and organize military-scientific work and scientifically compile training programs without precisely defining the subject and content of military science and the military problems of other sciences.

Finally, not only are the methodological reference points changing. Many new problems of military science are arising which require the soonest possible study. For example, at the conference, all the historians agreed that nuclear war is impossible.

The viewpoint on the unlikelihood of a conventional world war in the near future is also well-founded. Achieving political objectives by using military force will now be accomplished basically by three methods: setting limited objectives and accomplishing them successively in local wars; subversive operations against other countries; indirect strategic operations.

All our military theory, field manuals, and training literature are oversaturated with developments of waging nuclear and conventional world wars. Obviously, the fundamentals of nuclear planning should also change. In our view, it will have to be limited to the elaboration of the fundamentals of nuclear deterrence and methods of armed struggle calling for the use of

armed forces in local wars and in a major conventional war, but taking into account the threat of possible use of nuclear weapons.

In this regard, many new questions arise in the area of organizational development and training of armed forces, on which, in our view, the main efforts in military-scientific work should be concentrated.

General of the Army M.A. Gareyev, doctor of military sciences, professor

Military-historical science (like all historical science in our country) is in a deep crisis. The problem of cadres of military historians and also of military-historical work among personnel of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation also remains acute. The tasks placed before military-historical science by life are intense, serious, and diverse. Many of them cannot be accomplished in a few months, but they must not be put off.

The most difficult problem at this stage is eliminating "blank spaces" in military history, particularly of the Soviet period. We also do not now have a complete picture of their amount, although in recent years quite a bit was said in articles on historical topics. One of the immediate practical tasks, in our opinion, is a **historiographic assessment of all that has been done in the area of military history, particularly recently**. Now, when many previously inaccessible documents have become known, it turned out that the "official history" was truncated according to a number of parameters, far from reality. Historians were authorized to work with those documents and publish those works which "worked" for the society's political system that existed until recently and increased its prestige. Everything negative in the life of the country and army was carefully metered out in doses, and everything unfavorable was covered up, hushed up. When something secret suddenly became open, it was denied with persistence deserving of better use (as was the case with the secret protocol to the Soviet-German Non-aggression Treaty of 23 August 1939). So, almost everything new in scientific-historical publications of recent years is the "negative" that was hidden earlier, which (it is important to emphasize this) is also a part of our history.

Unfortunately, publication of such facts and documents earlier unknown to science often resulted in their authors being labeled as "slanderers" by those who wanted to know only that history which was presented to us all the preceding years.

It should be noted that today, too, researchers are not confident that they are writing "the entire truth," since access to many fundamentally important documents has been made difficult up to now. As we know, a whole set of facts is often required in order to prove something, but only one fact or document is enough to refute this same thing (for example, in the case of the above-mentioned secret protocol). Therefore, the likelihood is great that the historical concepts developed today may

prove to be unsound in the near future after the appearance of new information about which we do not yet know and about whose scientific importance we cannot even guess. However, this does not mean that historians have to wait until "everything is known."

An urgent practical task, in our view, is the creation of such works which would outline the current vision of problems of the country's military history, particularly its Soviet period, based on already accessible documents and materials. Accomplishing this task, to our regret, is made extremely complicated by the state of publishing in our country. But this is the topic for a special conversation.

Of course, the search for new archival documents and materials with their subsequent publication must be stepped up to create new works. A beginning has been set for this: the publishing center TERRA published a transcript of the December (1940) meeting of the top command personnel of the Red Army. It was prepared for press by associates of the Institute of Military History and the Russian State Military Archives. Next was a publication of collections of documents of the State Defense Committee, the General Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, the people's defense commissar, and other leadership bodies of the USSR Armed Forces during the Great Patriotic War. These collections will include declassified documents and materials not published before. Their publication will make it possible to take a new look at problems which seemed solved long ago, eliminate many "blank spaces," and help create objective scientific works about the Great Patriotic War. Certainly, introducing a huge mass of new documents into scientific circulation will mean a real breakthrough in elaborating such works.

As far as military history instruction at military academies and schools is concerned, the requirements of training programs to provide students (officer cadets) with "in-depth and sound knowledge of military history" will remain a good desire. The number of training hours allotted to a subject (up to 50 hours in schools and up to 150 hours in academies) does not permit this. In addition, the unending process of "shortening" the subject continues. The unsound practice existing at some military educational institutions, when up to 75 percent of the training time is allocated to group types of classes, is faulty. With a lack of new textbooks, they do not produce the desired results. In these conditions, **more time must be allotted to lectures. For only in this way can we effectively summarize new material on the military history on Russia and convey it to the students.**

Finally, it is necessary to **analyze military history as a science**. For the time being, it is only declared that military history includes the history of wars, the history of military art, the history of organizational development of the armed forces, the history of military equipment, and the history of military thought, as well as a number of auxiliary disciplines. However, none of these component parts (other than the history of military art)

so far has been elaborated in scientific terms and presented not only in the form of a book but even a good scientific-theoretical article. I think that, in this regard, an extensive field of activity is opening up for those who are involved with general problems of military history and its methodology.

Colonel (Ret) P.N. Bobylev, candidate of historical sciences, docent

One of the most important component parts of organizational development of the Russian Armed Forces—military education—is in need of a scientifically sound concept today. Successful resolution of this problem is impossible without combining the efforts of representatives of various fields of military knowledge. In working up a concept of education, it is necessary, above all, to take into account the radical nature and depth of army reforms being conducted and planned as a whole.

In these conditions, the novelty, complexity, and responsibility of resolving educational problems lie in the fact that the efficient and actively operating system of ideological-political, moral, and psychological training of servicemen that was developed over decades in the USSR Armed Forces had actually collapsed. A rejection of many once-unwavering theoretical and ideological dogmas followed. Many traditional forms and methods of educational work have been significantly constricted.

Re-creation of the education system has begun and is being accomplished with a search for the corresponding spiritual and moral reference points that are acceptable for the new Russia and its practically new army. Much from the historical past, especially the Soviet past, has to be rejected in this process. At the same time, much inevitably will have to be preserved, something forced to "remove anew," and enrich the current system of spiritual values with something.

In terms of content, the spiritual and moral values and reference points are to draw in, on the one hand, all the natural and historical experience of education and, on the other, everything new emerging from modern public life evolving in the direction of democratization and humanization of public relations in the country and the world as a whole.

The system of spiritual and moral values and reference points of military service have always included moral norms and ideals. Today, honesty, a high degree of patriotism, heroism, discipline, and so forth remain the moral norms of the defender of the fatherland.

In preserving the in-depth fundamentals, the ideals of military service today need to be freed from archaisms, pseudo-values, and utopianism. Above all, the patriotic idea of serving the homeland, enriched with democratic ideals, universal values, and the principle of the supremacy of human rights must emerge in a naturally primordial form.

Faith. It is more complicated. But since the human psyche, including the psyche of a soldier, is impossible without faith, here a very broad field of activity is opening up for military psychologists. Pluralism of religion is to enrich a soldier's spiritual and moral ideals.

By no means does the process of freeing a soldier's consciousness from the syndrome of "class struggle," "class morality," "image of an enemy," and other ideological guidelines of communist-totalitarian thinking mean that the emphasis in educational work with servicemen can be placed only on fostering loving feelings for everything and a peaceful nature merging with the worst variants of pacifism.

A soldier is called upon to know, understand, and sharply sense the watershed between good and evil, nobility and meanness, true and false patriotism, and identify and understand such anti-democratic, anti-humane social phenomena as racism, fascism, terrorism, aggression, and so forth.

Acquiring and assimilating moral norms and ideals by soldiers in the process of education can become the basis not only of their truly patriotic activities but also spiritual immunity with respect to any irrational misanthropic ideas which may be in use in the military environment in conditions of the often vulgar understanding of pluralism of ideas, views, and opinions.

A system of specialized bodies in the Army and Navy, putting into practice new forms and methods of individual and group (collective) education, is called upon to serve the new content of the spiritual and moral makeup of the Army.

In doing so, military researchers have grounds for a most attentive attitude toward structural elements of educational work already created or being created or, as it is now called, work with personnel in the Russian Armed Forces. It seems to me there is a real danger of a mechanical inheritance of many organizational principles, forms, and methods of this work from the recent past, the negative results of which are obvious. In particular, the primitive didactic principle of education widely used in the recent past is not very effective and does not reach the heart of today's young person. It must be replaced by rich pluralistic information activities and promotion of self-education.

I am confident that practical resolution of such important problems of education needs a revival of the progressive Russian military-pedagogical school and true reform of training military educators at all levels. Recent political workers in the Army and Navy from the Marxist-Leninist and communist school were not notable for their educational ability, since both in schools and academies they were trained according to the "jack-of-all-trades" principle. Experts of the human soul of this sort during the course of reforms must make room for true professionals of spiritual and moral education of servicemen. In turn, special educational institutions, faculties, and departments of a military-pedagogical,

military-psychological, and military-historical orientation are called upon to engage in training them. At the same time, taking into account the steadfastness of the principle of one-man command in the armed forces, commanders of all ranks are to possess military-psychological and military-pedagogical knowledge and skills.

The fundamental and multiple-aspect nature of problems of military education require an initial conceptual basis. The concept of education in turn cannot but take into account such factors as the scientific-theoretical substantiation of value reference points of education, the sum total of spiritual and moral norms and ideals being cultivated, and, finally, the qualitative state of the specific object of education. Its development is possible only on the scale of the state through the collective efforts of researchers and practical workers. The basis for this, it seems to us, has been created. Above all, the new Constitution of the Russian Federation and Russia's military doctrine must become the legal reference points of military education as a whole.

Captain 1st Rank (Ret) P.M. Shabardin, candidate of philosophical sciences

Military psychology is not among the generally recognized social-humanities disciplines comprising the methodological basis of organizational development of the armed forces. But at the same time, it is generally known that a modern army and navy cannot be built without psychology. The experience of the Russian Army is evidence of this. It is recorded in the *Military Encyclopedia*, published in 1912 in St. Petersburg and edited by I.D. Sytin, that in view of the complexities of military affairs, the study of it is broken down into a whole series of studies comprising the task of specific sciences. This should include, above all, tactics and military psychology.

Military education "on the one hand, should rely on conclusions of a person's psychology and physiology and, on the other, a study of the internal and external nature of war."²

A department of military psychology was formed in the Russian Army in 1908 under a society of ardent supporters of military knowledge. It had the task of developing military psychology as a branch of general and military sciences studying the best training and use of the psychic aspect—forces, means, and methods of armed struggle.³

At the same time, I would like to note the paradoxical aspect in the development of military psychology in recent years. Before reforming the political bodies in the armed forces into military-political bodies and then into structures for work with personnel at the Military Political Academy (today the Academy of the Humanities), three educational psychological disciplines were taught: military psychology—for officer political workers; military psychology and methods of its instruction—for officer

instructors of military psychology; psychology of higher military school—for instructors in other humanities disciplines.

Today, the cycle of educational and psychological disciplines being taught at the academy includes such subjects as the history of psychology, general psychology, social psychology, military psychology, psycho-physiology, age psychology, psycho-hygiene and psycho-therapy of military service, experimental psychology, psychology of pedagogical activities, professiology, and methods of teaching psychology. A number of special courses have been introduced (psychology of conflicts, medical psychology, psychology and interrelations, and others).

Skilled training programs and subject plans have been compiled for all educational disciplines. But here is what is surprising: at the military academy, the training program and subject plan were particularly poorly developed for the "military psychology" discipline. This was the result of the fact that many topics of a historical-psychological, general psychological, social-psychological, and other nature "went" into related educational disciplines, where they also were to be "registered" according to content. That is, the person "went" with his psychic phenomena, the collective "went" with the socio-psychological characteristics, and the content of military psychology faded.

Such a situation even further increased the need to resolve the question on the subject of military psychology. Is there a need for military psychology to include all the topics of general, social, and other divisions of psychology, having made only a corresponding verbal balancing act? Experience shows that the answer is no. Military psychology today as a scientific discipline is increasingly developing into the psychology of stress situations. It includes three main divisions: preparing for the behavior and actions of servicemen in stress (combat) situations; control and self-control of the mental state of servicemen, their behavior, and actions in stress situations; psychological rehabilitation of servicemen after coming out of stress situations (after stress-causing pressure).

In the course of these directions, a number of original and interesting studies have been conducted at the department of psychology at the Academy of the Humanities. Thus, B.I. Khoziyev, candidate of psychological sciences and docent, performed work to increase the quality of training (combat training) of military specialists of various fields. Colonel S.M. Zakharik defended a dissertation on the theme "Forming Psychological Stability of Paratroopers to the Influence of Factors of Modern Combat." Lieutenant Colonel V.Ye. Popov is successfully studying the problem of psychological orientation of servicemen after extreme pressure. A number of other works can also be cited that merit attention.

In conclusion, I would like to note that, in our view, military psychology is on the verge of a stage of qualitative development, summarization of earlier results, and breaking up its content during the course of modern research into a new scientific discipline—military psychology of stress situations.

Major-General S.I. Syedin, doctor of psychological sciences and professor

Footnotes

1. VOYENNAYA MYSL, 1993, No 9, pp 29-31.
2. Military Encyclopedia, St. Petersburg, 1912, Volume 6, pp 478, 486.
3. VESTNIK OBSHCHESTVA REVNITELEY VOYENNYKH ZNANIY, 1913, No 241, p 2.

COPYRIGHT: "Voyenno-istoricheskiy zhurnal", 1994.

FOREIGN MILITARY AFFAIRS

Turkey's Minister of Defense Arrives in Moscow

944D0008B Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
21 Apr 94 p 1

[Report by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent Mikhail Zheglov: "Turkey's Defense Minister Has Arrived in Moscow"]

[Text] On 20 April Minister of Defense of the Republic of Turkey Mehmet Gelhan arrived in Moscow on an official visit.

As is the custom in the West, the 65-year-old Gelhan is not a professional military man but a politician. He was one of the founders of the ruling Correct Way Party in Turkey. Prior to being appointed to his present post, he served as minister of state in the Tansu Ciler Cabinet.

By a convergence of circumstances the visit by the head of the Turkish military ministry to Russia coincided with a drastic exacerbation of the situation in the former Yugoslavia, as well as with stepped-up activities between Azerbaijan and Armenia. Since Turkey has interests in both areas, it has proposed its own alternatives for resolving the conflict. This set of issues will undoubtedly be the primary subject of discussion during talks with Russia's military leadership.

The main purpose of the visit, however, is still one of further developing bilateral technical military cooperation. It is no secret that a significant portion of the armament of Turkey's army does not measure up to contemporary requirements, and Turkey is interested in modernizing them with new purchases abroad. In October 1992 Turkey was the first NATO country to conclude an agreement with Russia on shipments of weapons and combat equipment, including helicopters and armored equipment. In May of last year the heads of the military ministries of the two countries signed a

memorandum of mutual understanding calling for bilateral cooperation in the areas of military training and the defense industry.

The signing of these agreements, especially the former, evoked a clear-cut reaction in the West. However, from all accounts, it will not pose an obstacle to the development of interaction between Russia and Turkey in the military area.

Grachev Discusses Flank Limits, Bases With Turkey's Minister

944D0008A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
22 Apr 94 p 3

[Report by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent Mikhail Zheglov: "Political Decisions Are Essential for the Establishment of Russian Bases in the CIS"]

[Text] On the afternoon of 20 April Army General Pavel Grachev, Russia's minister of defense, met with Turkey's Defense Minister Mehmet Gelhan.

During the discussion the sides covered bilateral interaction in the military area within the framework of the UN, the CIS and on an independent basis. The problem of flank limitations on arms and equipment for Russia in the south as a result of the collapse of the Soviet Union and the establishment of the Commonwealth of Independent States was raised during the meeting. Also discussed were issues pertaining to settlement of the Bosnian problem, the Armenian-Azerbaijani military conflict and implementation of the Treaty on Collective Security for the CIS States.

Among other things, Pavel Grachev declared that the Russian Federation would establish bases in the CIS states with their agreement. According to him, there will be three bases in Georgia and one in Armenia. It is planned to locate in Azerbaijan a Russian military facility needed by all the CIS states. It involves the Gaballa facility, a station for the prevention of a missile attack. The Russian Federation's minister of defense also reported that political decisions and the appropriate legal basis are essential for establishing Russian bases in the CIS countries.

At the culmination of the talks there was a ceremonial signing of a Russian-Turkish intergovernmental agreement on cooperation in the military-political area.

On 21 April Russia's First Deputy Minister of Defense Andrey Kokoshin met with Turkey's Defense Minister Mehmet Gelhan.

The meeting covered problems pertaining to the development of the situation in the Transcaucasus and Yugoslavia. It discussed prospects for the peaceful settlement of the conflicts. Also discussed were issues pertaining to the practical implementation of an agreement just signed by the defense ministers of Russia and Turkey.

Russian-South Korean Defense Cooperation Agreement

944D0005A Moscow *SEGODNYA* in Russian
No 81 (189) 30 Apr 94 p 2

[Report by Pavel Felgengauer under the rubric "A Visit": "The First Bell For Pyongyang: The Defense Ministers of the Russian Federation and South Korea Have Signed a Declaration of Cooperation"]

[Text] Yesterday in Moscow the ministers of defense of Russia and South Korea (Republic of Korea) signed a Declaration of Cooperation and a Memorandum on Mutual Understanding in Military Affairs between the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation and the Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Korea. "We have agreed to cooperate even more," said General Grachev. South Korea and Russia also officially expressed their satisfaction with the level of understanding achieved in the spirit of a similar declaration previously signed.

Moscow proposed, and this was supported in principle in Seoul, that a joint group of experts in the military-political area be set up to develop the concept of a system of collective security in the Asia-Pacific region. General Grachev hopes to draw experts from other interested countries into such consultations of experts (the USA, China, North Korea and others).

Pavel Grachev expressed "concern over the situation of nuclear affairs in North Korea." Moscow considers

Pyongyang's withdrawal from the Treaty on Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons to be extremely undesirable. In the future certain measures "to influence" (pressure) North Korea are possible, fairly mild ones at first. This extremely friendly reception of the Minister of Defense of the Republic of Korea in Moscow is obviously the first bell for Pyongyang.

General Lee Byung Tae announced that "we have found a common point of view on those measures which must be taken to prevent the situation in the region from deteriorating. North Korea must remain within the Treaty on Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons and become a full and, most important, a responsible member of the international community."

Pavel Grachev accepted an official invitation to visit Korea in '95. Russia's minister expressed his hope that it would be possible at that time to sign agreements on closer cooperation with South Korea, including agreements in the technical military area. General Lee Byung Tae, in turn, promised to do everything possible to see that a future visit by our minister to Seoul would be fruitful.

Recently the Japanese press has written extensively about the sale of old Russian submarines to North Korea for scrap through the intermediary of a Japanese company. Feliks Gromov, commander-in-chief of the Russian Federation's Navy, however, has assured a *SEGODNYA* correspondent that this matter "was not raised" at all in the talks with South Korea's defense minister. All of official Seoul's attention is focused on Pyongyang's possible nuclear armament. Old submarines are apparently of interest only to the journalists.

This is a U.S. Government publication. Its contents in no way represent the policies, views, or attitudes of the U.S. Government. Users of this publication may cite FBIS or JPRS provided they do so in a manner clearly identifying them as the secondary source.

Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) and Joint Publications Research Service (JPRS) publications contain political, military, economic, environmental, and sociological news, commentary, and other information, as well as scientific and technical data and reports. All information has been obtained from foreign radio and television broadcasts, news agency transmissions, newspapers, books, and periodicals. Items generally are processed from the first or best available sources. It should not be inferred that they have been disseminated only in the medium, in the language, or to the area indicated. Items from foreign language sources are translated; those from English-language sources are transcribed. Except for excluding certain diacritics, FBIS renders personal names and place-names in accordance with the romanization systems approved for U.S. Government publications by the U.S. Board of Geographic Names.

Headlines, editorial reports, and material enclosed in brackets [] are supplied by FBIS/JPRS. Processing indicators such as [Text] or [Excerpts] in the first line of each item indicate how the information was processed from the original. Unfamiliar names rendered phonetically are enclosed in parentheses. Words or names preceded by a question mark and enclosed in parentheses were not clear from the original source but have been supplied as appropriate to the context. Other unattributed parenthetical notes within the body of an item originate with the source. Times within items are as given by the source. Passages in boldface or italics are as published.

SUBSCRIPTION/PROCUREMENT INFORMATION

The FBIS DAILY REPORT contains current news and information and is published Monday through Friday in eight volumes: China, East Europe, Central Eurasia, East Asia, Near East & South Asia, Sub-Saharan Africa, Latin America, and West Europe. Supplements to the DAILY REPORTs may also be available periodically and will be distributed to regular DAILY REPORT subscribers. JPRS publications, which include approximately 50 regional, worldwide, and topical reports, generally contain less time-sensitive information and are published periodically.

Current DAILY REPORTs and JPRS publications are listed in *Government Reports Announcements* issued semimonthly by the National Technical Information Service (NTIS), 5285 Port Royal Road, Springfield, Virginia 22161 and the *Monthly Catalog of U.S. Government Publications* issued by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

The public may subscribe to either hardcover or microfiche versions of the DAILY REPORTs and JPRS publications through NTIS at the above address or by calling (703) 487-4630. Subscription rates will be

provided by NTIS upon request. Subscriptions are available outside the United States from NTIS or appointed foreign dealers. New subscribers should expect a 30-day delay in receipt of the first issue.

U.S. Government offices may obtain subscriptions to the DAILY REPORTs or JPRS publications (hardcover or microfiche) at no charge through their sponsoring organizations. For additional information or assistance, call FBIS, (202) 338-6735, or write to P.O. Box 2604, Washington, D.C. 20013. Department of Defense consumers are required to submit requests through appropriate command validation channels to DIA, RTS-2C, Washington, D.C. 20301. (Telephone: (202) 373-3771, Autovon: 243-3771.)

Back issues or single copies of the DAILY REPORTs and JPRS publications are not available. Both the DAILY REPORTs and the JPRS publications are on file for public reference at the Library of Congress and at many Federal Depository Libraries. Reference copies may also be seen at many public and university libraries throughout the United States.

END OF

FICHE

DATE FILMED

28 June 1994
